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Abstract
This thesis considers public policy eﬀects on crime in Sweden using exten-
sive administrative register data on all convictions in Sweden between 1973-2010.
First, it explores the impacts of the Swedish compulsory schooling reform that
took place between 1949-1962 on individual crime of the generation directly tar-
geted by the education reform. Then it considers the intergenerational eﬀect of
this education policy on crime. Policies are often evaluated on either short term
outcomes or just in terms of their eﬀect on individuals directly targeted. If such
policies shift outcomes across generations their beneﬁts may be much larger than
originally thought. This study provides novel evidence on the intergenerational
impact of policy by showing that educational reform in Sweden reduced crime
rates of the targeted generation and their sons by comparable amounts. The
second policy evaluated in this thesis is a liberalization of the opening hours
of the Swedish alcohol monopoly outlet stores that took place between 2000-
2001. This study distinguishes itself from existing studies by mapping out an
age-speciﬁc policy impact on crime for all ages and for a broad set of types of
crimes. Whether and how alcohol policies shift criminal outcomes diﬀerently
for diﬀerent ages and type of crimes is not well established. The liberalized
opening hours of outlet stores had very heterogeneous eﬀects on crime by age
and type of crimes. It reduced overall crime rates for male teenagers by 15-20
percent, mainly driven by reductions in drugs and property oﬀences. Men in
their mid-thirties also experience a substantial reduction of overall crime rates
by 9 percent that comes from reductions in other crimes category and traﬃc
crimes. While a strong increase of 10 percent in the crime rate for men in their
early to mid-twenties can be mainly attributed towards a large increase in drug
oﬀences.
Keywords: Economics of crime; public policy; compulsory education reform;
intergenerational transmission; returns to education; returns to human capital;
age-crime proﬁles; alcohol policy
JEL Codes: I18, I20; I21; I28; J18; J62; K14; K42; H75
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Introduction
Crime imposes large costs on society and public policies to reduce crime are various.
From the criminal justice system side, increased police resources or harsher punish-
ments have been considered as major tools to combat crime. While police and prison
might appear to be the obvious policy tools, it is now debated in the literature whether
alternative policies that are more cost eﬀective and at the same time improve other
outcomes should be considered. Education policy has been identiﬁed to be such an al-
ternative policy tool, see Lochner (2011). Two earlier papers by Lochner and Moretti
(2004) and Machin, Marie, and Vuji¢ (2011) study the relation between compulsory
schooling laws and criminal behavior. Lochner and Moretti (2004) demonstrate the
crime reducing eﬀect of education on crime using the increase of mandatory years
of schooling in the US on arrest and imprisonment rates. Machin, Marie, and Vu-
ji¢ (2011) compare criminal behavior of the cohorts just before and just after the
implementation of the comprehensive school system in Britain. These ﬁndings are
important because they show the broader impact of educational reform and a way of
improving outcomes for adults, beyond deterrence and punishment.
More generally, the links between economic incentives and crime have been estab-
lished both theoretically and empirically in earlier studies. A prominent example is
Freeman (1999) who outlines an economic model of crime where the choice between
criminal and legal activity is determined by comparing the expected utility of each.
Grogger (1998), Gould, Weinberg, and Mustard (2002), Machin and Meghir (2004),
and Edmark (2006) demonstrate the importance of wages and labor market oppor-
tunities in driving crime. One implication of this is that improved education may
reduce crime.
A more theoretically based approach was oﬀered by Lochner (2004) who develops
a life cycle model of education and crime and estimates a negative education-crime
relationship. A study, based on this human capital approach by Williams and Sickles
(2002) ﬁnds that years of schooling has a signiﬁcant negative eﬀect on crime in adult-
hood, and that there is a relationship between crime and other measures of human
capital. Earlier studies support this empirical evidence on the education-crime rela-
tionship. For example, Freeman (1996) states for the 1991 US Census that two thirds
of US prison inmates are high-school drop-outs and 12 percent of 24-35 year old high
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school drop outs were incarcerated in 1993.1
The ﬁrst chapter of this thesis empirically explores the impacts of a major edu-
cation reform in Sweden on crime on the directly targeted generation. The Swedish
compulsory school system was gradually introduced from 1949 to 1962 in municipali-
ties by cohort of pupils. It was originally studied by Meghir and Palme (2005) for its
eﬀects on education and earnings. As shown in Meghir and Palme (2005) the reform
signiﬁcantly increased the number of years of schooling as well as labor earnings of
those individuals who went through the new school system, in particular for individ-
uals originating from homes with low educated fathers, i.e. not more than statutory
level of schooling. This thesis ﬁrst establishes that this reform substantially decreased
crime rates of the target generation, in line with the previous literature on education
reforms and crime. The eﬀects of the reform on the sample of men whose complete
conviction history we are able to observe starting from age 18-21 onwards is a re-
duction in overall crime by 1.5 percentage points. The analysis separated by age at
oﬀence, emphasizes that the eﬀect is strongest at younger ages for convictions between
the ages of 20-24. Furthermore, the overall eﬀect is mainly driven by a reduction in
property and severe traﬃc crimes. The reform also had a substantial negative eﬀect
on being repeatedly convicted.
An outstanding question is to what extent education policies have long term ef-
fects on criminal behavior in the sense that they also aﬀect criminal behavior of the
children of those directly aﬀected by educational reforms. The second chapter moves
on to this novel contribution and analyses the reform eﬀects of parents on their son's
crime. There are good reasons to expect so, considering the strong intergenerational
correlations in criminality and the fact that education policies can aﬀect parental
resources as well as skills important for parenting. This is associated with the more
general question of whether policy can change the intergenerational transmission of
human capital and oﬀer a way of breaking the cycle of poverty.
Intergenerational associations of criminal behavior have been documented in the
literature. In the Swedish context Hjalmarsson and Lindquist (2012) document a
strong correlation between crime of fathers and children of both genders using the
Stockholm Birth Cohort Study. In a second Swedish study the same authors Hjal-
marsson and Lindquist (2013) focus on parent-child correlations in crime using adop-
1This negative correlation between crime and education has also been documented in the crimi-
nology and sociology literature, for example Sabates and Feinstein (2008a).
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tion data, to determine the factors through which mothers and fathers inﬂuence child
criminality, which follows the approach of Björklund, Lindahl, and Plug (2006). From
the economics point of view this question relates to the investments that parents make
in their children and the way that parental education may aﬀect such investments,
see Becker (1981).
The second chapter ﬁrst establishes that there exist a large intergenerational corre-
lation between fathers and sons crime, and between fathers education and sons crime.
Building onto the evaluation of the Swedish comprehensive school reform of the ﬁrst
chapter it then shows that the reform also substantially reduced crime for sons whose
father went through the new school system. The eﬀects are large with a 0.8 percentage
points decrease in crime rates for sons whose father was exposed to the new school
system. The eﬀect is mostly driven by a reduction in crime at early ages 15-19. The
crime types mostly aﬀected are violent crimes, traﬃc crimes and fraud. Furthermore,
the eﬀect is only present if the father was aﬀected by the reform - not the mother. The
chapter proceeds by showing that home environments (parental earnings, education,
parental quality match) improved for sons in families where the father was exposed
to the reform. It must be emphasized that these improvements in several dimensions
of the home environment cannot be interpreted as underlying mechanisms through
which crime rates were reduced. Though, they are in line with theories of intergener-
ational transmission of human capital (Cunha and Heckman (2007)) or theories from
sociology on the formation of social capital (Coleman (1988)).
The ﬁrst two chapters show that education reforms can have strong and long last-
ing eﬀects on crime. It establishes that own education can reduce crime, but also
shows an intergenerational eﬀect of such education policy. But, there are other im-
portant dimensions such as circumstances and temporary inﬂuences that are likely
to play a key role in criminal activity. Alcohol consumption is one such important
contributing factor for example to promote violent crimes. General statistics in the
US report that about 33 percent of state prisoners self report to have been under the
inﬂuence of alcohol at the time of the oﬀence in 2004 (see Bureau of Justice Statistics
(2004)), with even higher shares reporting alcohol inﬂuence for violent crimes and
public disorder. Similar statitistics in England and Wales show that victims of vio-
lence report in 47 percent of the cases that the oﬀender was perceived to be under the
inﬂuence of alcohol (see Crime Survey for England and Wales (2013)). While, these
correlations cannot be seen as causal pathways, they still point towards alcohol to be a
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key determinant in crime. Worldwide the importance of alcohol in criminal activity is
recognized by governments leading to a wide range of crime prevention policies, such
as Minimum Legal Drinking Age Laws, mandatory opening hours of bar and alcohol
outlet stores, etc. A large set of studies is concerned with estimating the impact of
such alcohol policies on crime, summarized in the survey of Carpenter and Dobkin
(2010). For example, convincing evidence on targeted sales restrictions, the type of
policy evaluated in the ﬁnal chapter, is presented in Biderman, De Mello, and Schnei-
der (2010). They document a large decline in homicides and battery following the
mandatory closing hours of bars in the São Paulo Metropolitan Area. In the Swedish
context a previous study by Grönqvist and Niknami (2011) ﬁnds increased property
crime rates and no eﬀect on violent crimes following the changes in the Saturday
opening hours in the Swedish state monopoly alcohol stores for men around the age
of 20, which is the legal limit to purchase alcohol in store. Minimum Legal Drinking
Age Laws have been used extensively, for example to show increased mortality rates,
motor vehicle deaths, or alcohol related deaths at the age cut-oﬀ (see Carpenter and
Dobkin (2009)). Also studies concerned with the question of complementarity versus
substitutability between alcohol and drugs have exploited MLDA laws in the US (see
Yörük and Yörük (2011), and opposing results in Crost and Guerrero (2012)).
The ﬁnal chapter of this thesis moves on to evaluating a public policy that can
contribute towards the circumstantial dimension of crime. The aim is to better un-
derstand the link between alcohol availability, age and diﬀerent crime types. Evidence
on the well established age-crime proﬁles shows that crime varies substantially across
ages and types of crimes which implies that the eﬀects of alcohol on crime are likely to
vary by age and types of crimes too (Farrington (1986), Moﬃtt (1993), and Sampson
and Laub (2003)). It expands the existing literature with a thorough analysis of how
alcohol policy can reduce/increase crime by types of crimes and most importantly
for all age-ranges, by being able to map out an age-proﬁle for a broader set of crime
categories. Thereby, it contributes towards the more general discussion of how alcohol
policy can be used as policy tool to inﬂuence crime, and more speciﬁcally towards the
existing literature using temporal restrictions as identifying strategy.
In 2000-2001 the Swedish government performed a policy experiment that ex-
panded opening hours of the alcohol monopoly stores to open on Saturdays. I exploit
this liberalization of alcohol availability to analyse how crime changes by age and type
of crime. The empirical analysis is based on a diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences approach ex-
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ploiting the staggered implementation of the policy across Swedish counties and time.
I ﬁnd that alcohol sales (in pure alcohol sold per capita) increased by 6.6-10 percent.
For overall crime rates by age I ﬁnd that the liberalized opening hours reduced crime
rates of men between the ages of 16-17 and 30-40. While, for two other age groups,
crime rates increased signiﬁcantly: For men in their twenties (20-28 year old men)
and for middle aged men (45-55 year old men). The ﬁndings are robust in particular
for the younger age groups. The overall results appear to be mainly driven by drug
crimes, traﬃc crimes, property crimes and fraud.
All empirical analyses in this thesis exploit various data sources from Sweden.
The empirical work is primarily based on individual register conviction data that
cover all convictions in Sweden between 1973-2010. This data was provided by The
Swedish National Council for Crime Prevention (Brå). For each individual conviction
in Sweden during that time the data contains an individual identiﬁer, the age of the
oﬀender at the time of the oﬀence, the date of the conviction, and the date of crime
committed, regional court identiﬁers, the number of crimes within each individual
conviction, and several variables that allow me to identify the type of the main crime
for which the individual was convicted (in a particular conviction). The type of
crime variables are based on the Swedish law books, sections of the law, paragraphs
etc. through which I deﬁne seven crime categories: violent crimes, property crimes,
fraud and tax oﬀences, drug crimes, traﬃc violations that exclude speeding or parking
tickets, sex crimes, and a category others that includes all other crimes that cannot
be categorized into one of the six. The data contain all crimes that individuals are
subsequently convicted for and the type of crime categorization is only limited by being
able to uniquely identifying a type of crime within the law book (for example assault
of a husband towards his wife can not be distinguished between assault towards a
stranger, both oﬀenders will be convicted based on the same laws concerning assault).
For chapters 1 and 2 the multi-generation register was used to link family connections
across three generations. This means we can link parental reform status to each
child in the considered sample, parental education and grandparent education. In
addition individual earnings and education data were used and matched on to the
crime data. For chapter 3 additional aggregated labour market data and population
data come from Statistics Sweden. The evaluation of the alcohol policy on alcohol sales
is performed based on alcohol sales data provided by the Swedish alcohol monopoly
13
store Systembolaget. The details of the relevant data sources and how the data was
constructed is provided in each chapter.
Overall, this thesis exploits extensive administrative data over a very long horizon
and for the entire Swedish population including various additional data sources to
analyze how public policies can aﬀect criminal behaviour. The focus lies on two po-
tentially very important determinants of crime - education and alcohol consumption.
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Chapter 1
Education Policy and Crime
1.1 Introduction
Earlier papers have demonstrated that crime and education are related and that
policies that increase education can reduce crime (see Lochner and Moretti (2004)).
There are strong theoretical reasons why this should be the case since increased ed-
ucation improves economic opportunity and can also increase the psychic costs of
committing crimes. Becker (1981), Freeman (1999) and Lochner (2004) amongst oth-
ers have developed theoretical models with these predictions. A number of papers
have demonstrated the empirical relevance of these models.1
We use data containing individual information on all convictions and prison sen-
tences in Sweden between 1973 to 2010, including details on the types of crimes
committed. The dataset also links information on three generations. This allows us
to estimate the eﬀect of the reform on both the parent generation (conﬁrming re-
sults from earlier studies) and on the child generation, by age and by type of crime,
while conditioning on the education level of the grandparent generation. This chap-
ter presents the results on the parent generation. Our empirical approach is based on
comparing changes in the crime rate across cohorts in municipalities that implemented
the reforms at diﬀerent times.
Two earlier papers by Lochner and Moretti (2004) and Machin, Marie, and Vuji¢
1Examples include Grogger (1998), Gould, Weinberg, and Mustard (2002) Machin and Meghir
(2004) and Edmark (2006). For Sweden Edmark (2006) shows the relationship between unemploy-
ment rates and property crimes on county level. Williams and Sickles (2002) ﬁnds that years of
schooling reduces crime in adulthood. Freeman (1996), based on the 1991 US census, documents
that 12 percent of 24-35 year old high school drop outs were incarcerated in 1993; The criminology
and sociology literature presents similar evidence, see e.g. Sabates and Feinstein (2008a) and Sabates
and Feinstein (2008b). Finally, Gallipoli and Fella (2008) develop an empirical model that allows for
the evaluation of policies designed to reduce crime allowing for general equilibrium eﬀects.
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(2011) respectively study the relation between compulsory schooling laws and criminal
behavior. Lochner and Moretti (2004) use changes in compulsory schooling laws
across time between US states to identify the eﬀect of increasing education on crime.
Exploiting the implementation of the comprehensive school system in Britain Machin,
Marie, and Vuji¢ (2011) compare criminal behavior of the cohorts just before and just
after the implementation to show similar crime reducing eﬀects of increased education.
In a recent paper Hjalmarsson, Holmlund, and Lindquist (2011) followed up on our
working paper (Meghir, Palme, and Schnabel (2011)) by extending the observation
window for convictions back to 1973 and obtaining data on crime by type; they then
focus on using the reform as an instrument for the impact of education on crime for
the parent generation only, i.e. for those who were directly aﬀected by the reform
- they do not consider intergenerational eﬀects. Their approach requires the strong
assumption that all the impact of the reform is mediated by the change in years of
education. Below we argue that this assumption is unlikely to hold, given the nature
of the reform. Since our original publication we have also extended our data back to
1973 and forward to 2010 obtaining also data on type of crime for both generations we
consider. The focus of this chapter is the impact of the reform itself on those directly
targeted by the reform and we are also able to investigate heterogeneity of eﬀects with
respect to socioeconomic status of the previous (grandparent) generation.2
This chapter is organized as follows. We ﬁrst provide a brief description of the
reform followed by a data section outlining our administrative data, documenting
the crime rates and presenting descriptive evidence. We then discuss our empirical
strategy followed by the results on the parent generation.
1.2 The 1950 Swedish Education Reform
1.2.1 The Reform
Prior to the implementation of the comprehensive school reform, pupils attended a
common basic compulsory school (folkskolan) until grade six. After the sixth grade
pupils were selected to continue one or (mainly in urban areas) two years in the basic
compulsory school, or to attend the three year junior secondary school (realskolan).
Selection of pupils into the two diﬀerent school tracks was based on their past grades.
2We argue in the paper that the reform cannot be used as an instrument for education in either
generation and as a result we focus on the direct eﬀect of the reform on both generations.
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The pre-reform compulsory school was in most cases administered at the municipal-
ity level. The junior secondary school was a prerequisite for the subsequent upper
secondary school, which, in turn, was required for higher education.
In 1948 a parliamentary school committee proposed a school reform that imple-
mented a new nine-year compulsory comprehensive school, abolished early tracking
and introduced a national curriculum. Until the age of 16 all children would hence-
forth attend a comprehensive school with a national curriculum. The extension to
nine years of compulsory schooling meant that in many parts of the country the
compulsory increase was two years, while in others it was one.3
The reform is a combination of various components, all of which have been elements
of reforms in other countries. For example, England increased compulsory school
leaving age in 1973 from 15 to 16 and abolished selection at 11, gradually creating
comprehensive schools starting in the mid-sixties.4 In the early eighties England also
adopted a common curriculum. Thus, the eﬀect of these reforms is of general interest
in itself and showing an impact on crime, even as a package, can be of broad interest.
If we could disentangle the impact of each component of the reform we could
learn more. Unfortunately, with the current design this is not possible as they were
all implemented together. And while diﬀerent groups based on socioeconomic status
may be aﬀected diﬀerently by the various components, spill-over eﬀects will ensure
that all are impacted as a result of the diﬀerent components. For example, increasing
compulsory schooling and abolishing tracking would change the social mix in schools
and dilute the resources available per child. Indeed, this is a key reason why the
reform cannot be safely used as an instrument for years of education.
1.2.2 The Social Experiment
The proposed new school system, as described above, was introduced gradually from
1949 to 1962 in municipalities or parts of city communities, which in 1952 num-
bered 1,055 (including 18 city communities).5 The selection of municipalities was not
random. However, the selection of areas was guided by an attempt to ensure the
3The school reform and its development are described in Meghir and Palme (2003), Meghir and
Palme (2005), and Holmlund (2007). For more detailed reference on the reform, see Marklund (1980)
and Marklund (1981).
4Some parts of England still have selection, e.g. Kent.
5This was done for evaluation purposes as well as a way of resolving the political diﬀerences relat-
ing to the reforms. The oﬃcial evaluation National School Board (1959) was mainly of administrative
nature. Details on this evaluation are also described in Marklund (1981).
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implementing municipalities were representative of the whole country, both in terms
of demographics as well as geographically. Given the design of the social experiment
our approach will be based on a diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences estimation strategy.
Figure 1.1: Number of Individuals in Sample Assigned to the Reform
When a municipality introduced the new school system it implemented it either
for the cohort of pupils who were in ﬁfth grade at the time of the decision or for those
who were currently in the ﬁrst grade, eﬀectively delaying the start of the program. In
our analysis we consider cohorts born between 1945 and 1955. Figure 1.1 shows the
number of observations in our sample in each year birth cohort and the proportion of
the parent generation assigned to the reform.
As mentioned above, the reform was not implemented randomly across municipal-
ities. Both the central government and the local authority had a say on whether and
when the reform would be implemented. In the empirical analysis that will follow
we will be controlling for municipality ﬁxed eﬀects and other characteristics that vary
over time to allow for permanent and potentially confounding characteristics that may
diﬀer across early and late implementers. Nevertheless, it is interesting to document
here how these municipalities diﬀered. Thus, we run a regression of the earliest cohort
for which a municipality implemented the reform on three municipality characteris-
tics that are potentially correlated with the municipality crime rate: population size,
average income and tax rate in 1960, when the reform could not have any eﬀects on
outcomes. The results shown in Table 1.1 imply that early implementers were higher
income and had a higher local tax rate. The municipality population size had no
eﬀect.
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Table 1.1: Timing of Implementation and Municipality Characteristics
Dependent variable: ﬁrst cohort implemented
(1) (2)
all municipalities excluding Stockholm
Population in 1960 0.036 0.083
(0.039) (0.074)
Income level in 1960 -0.072*** -0.074***
(0.012) (0.012)
Tax rate in 1960 -0.654*** -0.662***
(0.066) (0.067)
Observations 984 983
Notes: Signiﬁcance levels *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The dependent
variable is the cohort when the reform was ﬁrst implemented in the mu-
nicipality, the regressors are municipality population size, average income
and tax rate in 1960.
1.3 Data Sources and Descriptive Statistics
We use a sample originally obtained from Sweden's population census. To link individ-
uals across generations we used the multi-generation register, provided by Statistics
Sweden.6 We are able to link and use three generations in our analysis: the parent
generation consisting of all individuals born in Sweden between 1945 and 1955, who
attended school during the social experiment described above; their parents labeled as
the grandparent generation; and their children referred to as the children generation.7
We do not have direct information on individual assignment to the reform. Our
reform assignment variable is based on information on parish of birth from the popula-
tion census. Using information on year of birth and when the individual's municipality
of birth implemented the reform we then use an algorithm provided by Helena Holm-
lund (see Holmlund, 2007) to decide whether or not the individual went through the
pre or post reform school system.
The advantage with using this variable for reform assignment, rather than one
based on direct information on type of school attended, is that it is not susceptible
to endogeneity caused by parents moving to municipalities on the basis of preferences
for school system for their children. The disadvantage is that it might lead to some
attenuation of the eﬀects of the reform because some individuals may have moved
leading to some measurement error with respect to actual assignment.
Fortunately, we can investigate this by deriving a reliability ratio (see Aigner
(1973)); For a subset of the data set - those born the 5th, 15th or 25th each month
6See Statistics Sweden (2003).
7Even though we have information on biological and adoptive parents and children, we exclude
all individuals who have been adopted, or who have adopted children themselves.
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in 1948 or 19538 we have register-based information on which school system they
actually were assigned to. For 87.3 percent of this sample we were able to match
information on actual reform assignment and the one predicted by the municipality
of birth - which is what we use in this study. The discrepancy between the two
measures is only 9.9 percent: 5.3 percent moved to a non-reform municipality and 4.6
percent moved in the other direction. This implies that on average our estimates will
be attenuated by a factor of 0.901 with respect to correct assignment to the reform.9
Data on all convictions in Sweden covering the time period between 1973 and
2010 is provided by the Swedish National Council for Crime Prevention (Brå) and
has been linked to individuals in our data set using the unique personal identifying
number. This means we are able to link individuals to actual convictions, which is
an advantage of our study compared to previous studies of the eﬀects of education
reform on criminal behavior (Lochner and Moretti (2004) and Machin, Marie, and
Vuji¢ (2011)). For each conviction we have detailed information on the type of crime
for the main violation within the conviction and the age when it was committed.
We categorize crimes into seven types: violent crimes, property crimes, fraud and tax
evasion, traﬃc crimes, drug and traﬃcking violations, sex crimes and others containing
crimes that cannot be categorized as any of the latter six categories. The traﬃc crimes
need to be serious enough to lead to a court case and do not include speeding and
parking oﬀenses.10
We select the sample of men born 1945-1955 who were alive in 1973 (when the
crime records begin) and who had not migrated out of Sweden permanently. Infor-
mation on the education level for the parent generation and child generation was
obtained and matched onto our sample from the Swedish National Education Reg-
ister. From the education census we also link in the education of their fathers (the
grandparent generation), which is available if they were younger than 60 in 1970, i.e.
for 71.6 percent of the cases.
Under the column "Total", Table 1.2 shows the overall conviction rate for men in
8These are included in the so called UGU-data set, collected by the Department of Education,
Gothenburg University - see Meghir and Palme, 2005.
9The attenuation coeﬃcient is Pr(R = 1|RB = 1)− Pr(R = 1|RB = 0) = 0.947− 0.046 where R
denotes actual reform assignment and RB reform assignment based on municipality of birth.
10Types of crimes are detailed in several variables that specify the chapter, paragraph, moment,
piece and point in the section of the relevant penal code (law-book). Details of the types-of-crime
variables in the conviction data are in Brå Variabelbeskrivning Lagföringsregistret (2009) and the
documentation of coding crime types can be found in Brå Kodning av Brott (2010). The crime
register also contains information on the number of crimes within each individual's conviction, the
date of conviction, the age of the oﬀender, as well as the penalty for each crime.
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the parent generation. We also report the conviction rate by type of crime conditional
on being convicted in the remaining columns. Since individuals can have multiple
convictions these columns add up to more than 100. The conviction rates corresponds
to the observation period 1973-2010. During the entire observation period 1973-2010,
34 percent of men in the parent generation have been convicted at some point of
a crime. Of those convicted 58 percent were convicted of a traﬃc crime (serious
enough to lead to a court case), 21 percent of a property crime, 18 percent for fraud
(including tax evasion) and 33 percent of "other" unspeciﬁed crimes. One in ﬁve
convictions led to a prison sentence. Additional support of such high conviction rates
in Sweden is provided by other Swedish studies that have shown similar conviction
rates, see Hjalmarsson and Lindquist (2012), Hjalmarsson and Lindquist (2013), and
Grönqvist (2011). In Appendix Table 1.8 we separately report conviction rates for
individuals from a lower socio-economic status (SES) background, which in the entire
paper refers to those individuals for whom the grandparent generation had just pre-
reform statutory level of education. Their conviction rates are only slightly higher.
This surprising result might be due to the fact that the low SES group represents 63
percent of the population.
Table 1.2: Conviction Rates by Age and Types of Crimes for Parent Generation
Percent convicted by crime types conditional on being convicted
Total Violent Property Fraud Traﬃc Drugs Sex Others Prison
Panel A: Men in Parent Generation: at least one conviction
All 33.94 14.97 21.02 18.16 57.96 17.04 1.623 33.23 19.65
ages 20-24 19.11 10.12 25.66 11.82 43.20 17.75 0.409 30.88 16.29
ages 25-29 11.53 10.54 21.89 14.75 39.35 20.57 0.669 28.60 20.82
ages 30-39 12.68 13.93 19.06 19.84 43.84 15.93 1.252 28.85 21.44
ages 40-49 11.21 13.36 13.49 13.62 54.92 9.350 1.523 24.17
Panel B: Men in Parent Generation: multiple convictions
All 15.75 25.40 34.79 30.03 71.06 24.98 2.518 49.17 35.54
ages 20-24 6.399 18.66 48.30 24.26 52.82 26.13 0.751 48.04 35.43
ages 25-29 3.620 19.99 42.35 29.79 49.89 29.29 1.097 43.41 43.71
ages 30-39 4.313 26.12 37.74 35.04 56.54 24.55 1.902 43.65 44.26
ages 40-49 3.309 25.00 29.65 24.56 64.23 18.84 2.175 38.65
Notes: Table shows overall conviction rates (Total) and type of crimes rates conditional on having been convicted at
least once or twice. The sample are men with all SES. For the age speciﬁc conviction rates only men who are fully
observed for the relevant age bracket are included. For Panel A and B: All includes the whole sample of men born
45-55 (N=447,382) and the conviction rates refers to having ever been convicted or having been convicted at least twice
between 1973-2010. Age speciﬁc conviction rates for men in Parent Generation includes: for ages 20-24 cohorts 53-55
(N=133,200), for ages 25-29 cohorts 48-55 (N=339,888), and for ages 30-39, and 40-49 the whole sample of cohorts
45-55 (N=447,382).
The Table also reports conviction rates by age. Comparing the crime rates of the
parent generation across age groups11 shows that conviction rates decline with age,
11Note the 5-year age ranges deﬁned for men below 29, versus the 10-year age ranges for men
above 30.
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which applies to all types of crimes. This is best seen in Figure 1.2 for the parent
generation, which shows a pronounced decline of crime with age.
Figure 1.2: Age Proﬁle of Crime Rate for the Parent Generation by Cohort
Table 1.2 also provides information on more serious criminal activity, namely con-
victions leading to prison and multiple (2+) convictions, as well as the percent con-
victed of each type of crime conditional on having 2+ convictions. The distribution
by type of crime involves more violent, property and fraud crime, although traﬃc
related crimes are also prevalent. About 20 percent of those convicted in the parent
generation were incarcerated. Moreover, when we consider multiple convictions the
prevalence of violent, fraud and property crimes increases.
In Appendix Table 1.10 we report the crime rates for women. These are almost
a quarter of the male rates. As with men there is no diﬀerence in the crime rates
when we focus on the low SES background. The reform has no discernible eﬀect on
these rates and we present results in the Appendix for completeness. However, we do
examine whether exposing the mother to the reform aﬀects the crime rate of sons in
Chapter 2.
1.4 Empirical Strategy
The main outcome variables we use is whether an individual was ever convicted during
the observation window 1973-2010 for any crime and by type of crime; and whether
an individual was convicted at certain ages: 20-24, 25-29, and 30-39 for the parent
generation. We present results for the whole sample and separately for those with a
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low SES background.
Our outcome variable is based on convictions and incarcerations, rather than of-
fending as such. By the administrative nature of our data this is what we observe.
The interpretation of our results presumes that the impact on convictions reﬂects
a real reduction in crime and not simply an improved ability by criminals to evade
arrest and convictions. So a key assumption in this approach is that the reform did
not aﬀect the relationship between oﬀending and convictions.
The crime records start in 1973 and the gradual transition to the new school system
covers the cohorts born between 1945-1955. As documented above, most crimes are
committed by young people and it is this age group that is most likely to be aﬀected
by the reform. Thus, for the parent generation we estimate impacts on crime for the
1952-55 cohort who were 18-21 years old in 1973 when our records begin. They are
followed up until 2010 when they are 55-58. The crime rate of females is very low -
about a quarter of the male one, and was not aﬀected by the reform; so we include
the results for women in an Appendix for completeness but do not discuss the results
at depth.
Since the reform was not randomized we control for potential diﬀerences across
treatment and control municipalities using a diﬀerence in diﬀerences approach. This
compares the change in the crime across cohorts in municipalities that implemented
the reform for the younger cohort but not the older one to the change in crime rate
across the same cohorts living in municipalities where there was no change in policy for
these same cohorts. In practice we do this for all considered cohorts in our window and
all 1000 or so municipalities. Thus our approach is best described by the regression





where y∗i,m,t is the latent crime "intensity" outcome observed for person i born in
municipality m and in birth cohort t. A conviction corresponds to y∗i,m,t > 0. Ri,m,t is
the reform indicator, which equals one if individual i belongs to a municipality and
cohort that has been assigned to the new school system; ti is a vector of indicator
variables indicating to which cohort individual i belongs to and Mi is a vector of
indicator variables indicating in which municipality individual i was born. i,m,t is
conditionally independent of Ri,m,t. The general assumptions underlying the method
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of Diﬀerence in Diﬀerences whether unconditional or conditional on explanatory vari-
ables (like here) are discussed in Heckman and Robb (1985), Heckman, Ichimura,
Smith, and Todd (1999) and Athey and Imbens (2006).
Based on the latent equation above we use the linear probability model (LPM),
which we estimate by GLS. The main reason for this speciﬁcation is computational
convenience: there are about 1,000 municipality and 4 (or depending on speciﬁcation
up to 11) cohort ﬁxed eﬀects. To check whether using a LPM biases the results we
ran a Monte Carlo experiment replicating the crime rates across municipalities and
imposing an average eﬀect of the reform equal to what we obtain. Assuming the
data was generated by a normal probability model (probit) and then using a LPM
only biased the results upwards by 5 percent with respect to the true average eﬀect
- a diﬀerence that is statistically indistinguishable in our data. In what follows all
regressions include a full set of ﬁxed eﬀects for the birth municipality and the cohort
of the parent generation, as well as the education level of the previous (grandparent)
generation. All standard errors are clustered at the municipality level.
1.5 The Reform, Educational Attainment and Crime
in the Parent Generation
1.5.1 Education
Table 1.3 shows the estimates of the eﬀects of the education reform on years of school-
ing for the parent generation.12 The results are presented for all men and all women
born between 1945 and 1955, as well as separately by SES background.
The reform signiﬁcantly increased years of schooling of both men and women and
substantially more so for the former. The overall eﬀect is larger for the low SES
group. We also ﬁnd a small but signiﬁcant eﬀect (at the 10 percent level) on the men
with higher educated fathers. We ﬁnd no eﬀect on those women from a higher SES
background.13
In our analysis of crime that follows we show results for the whole sample and
12Years of schooling are inferred from the level of schooling attainment obtained from the registers.
13In Appendix Table 1.13 we also show results with municipality speciﬁc trends - this does not
lead to any large or signiﬁcant changes. Comparing with Meghir and Palme (2005) the eﬀects are
overall slightly diﬀerent. However, these estimates relate to a larger group of cohorts - not 1948 and
1953, and the results might be attenuated by a factor of 0.9 because we use municipality of birth
instead of actual reform assignment.
24
Table 1.3: Reform Eﬀects on Years of Schooling for Parent Generation
Dependent variable: Own years of schooling
(1) (2) (3)
Sample: All SES Low SES High SES
Panel A: Men born 45-55
Reform 0.174*** 0.267*** 0.052*
(0.038) (0.038) (0.030)
Obs 444,272 282,080 162,192
mean years of schooling 11.62 10.91 12.85
Panel B: Women born 45-55
Reform 0.108*** 0.161*** 0.051
(0.033) (0.029) (0.032)
Obs 423,781 268,567 155,214
mean years of schooling 11.75 11.14 12.80
Notes: Signiﬁcance levels *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The dependent
variable is number of years of own schooling. Robust standard errors, clus-
tered by municipality of birth, in parentheses; all regressions include a full
set of birth municipality and birth cohort indicator variables of individual.
Column (1) includes father's education levels.
for the low SES group separately. We do not show results for the high SES group
separately because there is insuﬃcient precision to draw clear conclusions.
1.5.2 Crime
This section reports results for the parents, providing a link with the existing literature
and establishing that the reform did indeed have a direct eﬀect on crime.14
Table 1.4: Reform Eﬀects on Crime by Types of Crimes for Parent Generation
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Any Violent Property Drugs Traﬃc Fraud
Panel A: Men born 52-55, All SES, Obs: 176,232
Reform -1.464*** -0.364 -0.783** -0.427 -1.391*** -0.334
(0.556) (0.297) (0.347) (0.294) (0.473) (0.269)
y¯ % 38.62 6.156 9.366 7.233 22.59 7.024
Panel B: Men born 52-55, Low SES, Obs: 107,557
Reform -1.693** -0.344 -0.757* -0.409 -1.899*** -0.490
(0.680) (0.357) (0.421) (0.361) (0.604) (0.355)
y¯ % 40.00 6.946 10.09 7.291 23.66 7.438
Notes: Signiﬁcance levels *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Results are scaled by
100. The dependent variables are indicator variables for having ever been convicted
between 1973-2010 for any crime in column (1), or one of the crime types speciﬁed
in columns (2)-(6). Robust standard errors, clustered by municipality of birth, in
parentheses; all regressions include a full set of birth municipality and birth cohort
indicator variables of individual. Panel A also includes father's education levels.
In Table 1.4 we present the eﬀects of crime on the parent generation for cohorts
14See Lochner and Moretti (2004).
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1952-55, who are aged 18-21 at the start of our observation year in 1973. Descriptive
statistics for these cohorts are presented in Appendix Table 1.9. The crimes we observe
are always after the end of statutory schooling and hence the eﬀects do not include
the more mechanical eﬀect of keeping children oﬀ the streets. The overall eﬀect of
the reform is to reduce by 1.46 percentage points the probability of a conviction over
the entire observation period - the eﬀect is highly signiﬁcant. When we keep only the
low SES individuals the impact increases to 1.69 percentage points but the diﬀerence
is not signiﬁcant.
In the remaining columns we split up the eﬀect by type of crime committed. Here
it becomes clear that the impact is driven by property crime, which decline by 0.78
percentage points and traﬃc crimes, which decline by 1.39 percentage points. Note
that the impacts by type will typically add up to more than the total eﬀect, because
many individuals commit more than one type of oﬀense.
In the descriptive statistics it became obvious that younger people have much
higher crime rates; it is thus reasonable to expect the impact of the reform to be
concentrated at younger ages. Indeed this is the case as we show in Table 1.5: the
eﬀect for the 20-24 age group is -0.988, declines slightly for the 25-29 age group and
becomes much smaller and insigniﬁcant for the 30-39 year olds of the same cohort
(although the estimates are not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from each other).
Table 1.5: Age Speciﬁc Reform Eﬀects on Crime for the Parent Generation
(1) (2) (3)
Convicted at age: 30-39 25-29 20-24
Panel A: Men born 52-55, All SES, Obs. 176,232
Reform -0.347 -0.890** -0.988**
(0.392) (0.386) (0.448)
y¯% 12.38 11.61 18.65
Panel B: Men born 52-55, Low SES, Obs. 107,557
Reform -0.508 -0.657 -1.045*
(0.475) (0.485) (0.565)
y¯% 13.19 12.28 19.79
Notes: Signiﬁcance levels *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Results are scaled by 100. The dependent variables are
indicator variables for having ever been convicted between
the ages of 30-39, 25-29, and 20-24. The sample are men
from the parent generation born 52-55. Robust standard
errors, clustered by birth municipality, in parentheses; all
regressions include a full set of birth municipality and birth
cohort indicator variables of the individual. Panel A also
includes father's education levels.
We also estimated the eﬀect of the reform on women. We found no discernible
eﬀects. The complete set of estimates are presented in Appendix Tables 1.11 and
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1.12.
It is interesting to estimate the eﬀect of the reform on more serious criminal
activity, since this will be associated with larger social costs. To get at this we
consider impacts on recidivism, i.e. on the probability of having two or more (2+)
separate convictions as well as convictions that lead to a prison sentence. Table 1.6
shows that the impact of the reform on having 2+ convictions is very strong, reducing
them by 1.48 percentage points overall and by 1.77 percentage points for the low SES
group. When we consider the eﬀects by age (in the next three columns) we get a
strong eﬀect for the youngest group, which is higher for the low SES individuals. We
also seem to get a marginally signiﬁcant eﬀect for the older 30-39 age group.
Table 1.6: Reform Eﬀects on Recidivism and Incarceration for Parent Generation
Dependent variables: Multiple convictions/Recidivism Incarceration
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Convicted at age: All 30-39 25-29 20-24 All
Panel A: Men born 52-55, All SES, Obs. 176,232
Reform -1.476*** -0.422* -0.344 -0.896*** -0.488
(0.491) (0.227) (0.233) (0.290) (0.316)
y¯% 18.88 4.422 3.824 6.206 7.507
Panel B: Men born 52-55, Low SES, Obs. 107,557
Reform -1.767*** -0.409 -0.284 -1.053*** -0.580
(0.566) (0.293) (0.283) (0.339) (0.366)
y¯% 20.07 4.849 4.192 6.889 8.211
Notes: Signiﬁcance levels *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Results are scaled by 100. The
dependent variables are indicator variables for having been convicted at least twice between
1973-2010 (column (1)) or between the ages of 30-39, 25-29, and 20-24 (columns (2)-(4)), or
an indicator variable for having ever been convicted for a prison sentence between 1973-2010
in column (5). The sample are men from the parent generation born 52-55. Robust standard
errors, clustered by birth municipality, in parentheses; all regressions include a full set of birth
municipality and birth cohort indicator variables of the individual. Panel A includes father's
education levels.
Only 30 percent of convictions end up in prison sentences for the parent generation
(incarceration rate 7.5 percent). At the tails of the distribution the linear probability
model may not be a very good approximation. So we estimated the eﬀects in two
diﬀerent ways; ﬁrst we use the LPM. Second, we use a probit, using a reduced set
of ﬁxed eﬀects: we group the municipalities by the ﬁrst cohort for which they imple-
mented the reform and deﬁne a ﬁxed eﬀect for each of these groups. This probit gives
almost identical results to the LPM and hence we report results from the latter.15
The LPM results are presented in Table 1.6. The estimates are negative and quite
large implying a reduction in prison by about 0.49-0.58 percentage points (st. error
15For example for the 52-55 cohort of the adult generation the impact with the probit is -0.497 (se
0.329), while with the LPM and a full set of municipality ﬁxed eﬀects we get -0.488 (se 0.316).
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0.32-0.37). For those from a low education background the eﬀects are signiﬁcant at
the 10 percent level.
1.6 Common Trends Assumption Parent Generation
One of the key identifying assumptions of our approach is that the underlying trends
in crime are the same irrespective of the birth municipality of the parent generation.
This section provides evidence for this assumption in two ways: ﬁrst, we repeat our
estimation assuming that the reform took place at a diﬀerent date than it actually
did (placebo estimations); second, we explicitly include municipality speciﬁc trends
to evaluate whether they are signiﬁcant (akin to a test of overidentifying restrictions)
and whether our results are sensitive to their inclusion. For these tests we group
municipalities by the earliest cohort for which they implemented the reform and we
look for omitted trends speciﬁc to each of these groups.
For the placebo estimations, where we pretend that the reform was implemented
later, we only use the sample of men born 52-55 who were treated by the reform.
To construct placebo treatment and control groups we then pretend that the reform
was implemented successively one or two years later. We (falsely) assign the ﬁrst
treated cohort (the ﬁrst two treated cohorts or the ﬁrst three treated cohorts) in each
municipality group to be untreated and the remaining ones to the treated group. This
provides two placebo estimates.
Similarly, for the placebo estimations where we pretend that the reform was im-
plemented earlier, we restrict the sample to men born 52-55 who were not treated
by the reform.16 The placebo treatment groups are deﬁned by (falsely) assigning the
two last untreated cohorts or the three last untreated cohorts to the treated group
and the remaining cohorts stay in the control group. This provides an additional two
placebo estimates.
The results are all brought together in Figure 1.3. Each dot represents the estimate
assuming the reform took place at the speciﬁed period on the x-axis (relative to when
it actually took place, which is the zero point). The vertical line around the dot
represents the 95 percent conﬁdence interval. The graph shows that the largest (in
absolute value) and only signiﬁcant eﬀect is obtained when we use the correct timing
16We require at least two treated cohorts and one untreated cohort in each municipality group
to implement the estimator. This means that we start our ﬁrst placebo estimation pretending the
reform was implemented two years earlier than it actually was.
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Figure 1.3: Placebo Estimations Men 52-55
for the reform assignment (that is at zero). In all other cases we estimate insigniﬁcant
eﬀects and no particular pattern shows up implying there is nothing systematic taking
place biasing the results towards an eﬀect on crime.
For our second approach, Table 1.7 shows F-statistics and p-values for two tests:
that the trends are not speciﬁc to groups of municipalities (sorted by cohort of ﬁrst
implementation) and that the impacts remain unaﬀected by the inclusion of such
trends. We ﬁnd no evidence that such speciﬁc trends are present. For completeness
the parameter estimates obtained when these trends are included are shown in the
Appendix in Tables 1.13 - 1.16. For example, the overall eﬀect on any crime for the
52-55 men without any municipality speciﬁc trends is -1.464 (se 0.556) while when we
include trends this becomes -1.292 (se 0.921). For the lower SES group the eﬀect drops
a bit from -1.693 (se 0.680) to -1.495 (se 1.053). None of these changes are signiﬁcant.
There is a loss in precision when the municipality speciﬁc trends are added. Some
of the eﬀects become larger and even signiﬁcant when they were not before (e.g. the
impact on drugs crime and the impact on crime between ages 25-29). Nevertheless, as
shown, the diﬀerences are not signiﬁcant and the overall conclusions do not change.
Table 1.7: Trends Tests for Parent Generations
Tests: Joint test of trends=0 Reform parameter across models
(1) (2) (3) (4)
All SES Low SES All SES Low SES
F statistic/chi2 statistic 0.804 0.803 0.066 0.062
P-value 0.690 0.691 0.797 0.804
Notes: Test 1 jointly tests the hypothesis that trends are common across municipalities. Test 2 tests




The Swedish educational reform increased education for the men (and women) directly
targeted by the reform, conﬁrming the previous results of Meghir and Palme (2005)
for a diﬀerent sample of cohorts. This chapter established further, that the reform
reduced the crime rates of men who were directly aﬀected by the reform (the parent
generation). Our analysis of this generation is limited by the fact that we start
observing them from the age of 18-21 onwards. Thus, we are not able to map out a
complete picture from the beginning of their criminal career, though for the selected
cohorts, we are able to observe them for an age with highest criminal activity. The
overall crime impacts are driven by a reduction in property crimes and serious traﬃc
crimes that lead to a guilty court verdict. Violent and drug-related crimes remained
unaﬀected. The reform also had a large impact on repeated criminal activity for men
in the relevant cohorts. The crime rate of women, which was already much lower was
not aﬀected. Overall, the results conﬁrm earlier ﬁndings of the impact of compulsory
schooling reforms on crime in the US (Lochner and Moretti (2004)) and in the UK
(Machin, Marie, and Vuji¢ (2011)). The next chapter moves on to the impact on the
child generation - which is a novel contribution in the literature. It also expands on
the discussion of the results on crime in the parent generation.
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1.8 Appendix - Chapter 1
1.8.1 Appendix - Descriptives
Table 1.8: Conviction Rates by Age and Type of Crimes Conditional on Being Con-
victed for Low SES Men in Parent Generation
Percent convicted by crime types conditional on being convicted
Total Violent Property Fraud Traﬃc Drugs Sex Others Prison
Panel A: Men of Parent Generation, low SES: at least one conviction
All 34.73 16.19 21.63 18.36 58.59 16.68 1.765 33.71 20.56
ages 20-24 20.32 11.28 26.40 12.22 44.32 16.85 0.408 31.07 17.23
ages 25-29 12.09 11.55 22.28 15.11 40.93 19.85 0.769 27.88 21.32
ages 30-39 13.27 14.94 19.57 19.68 44.97 15.06 1.362 28.87 22.44
ages 40-49 11.51 14.37 14.31 13.85 53.72 9.343 1.623 25.05
Panel B: Men of Parent Generation, low SES: multiple convictions
All 16.44 27.22 35.71 30.28 71.64 23.99 2.738 49.78 36.90
ages 20-24 7.143 20.00 48.98 24.66 54.49 24.28 0.693 47.97 36.80
ages 25-29 3.929 21.84 43.04 30.09 51.29 27.76 1.243 42.80 45.02
ages 30-39 4.653 27.50 38.52 34.47 57.46 22.95 2.029 43.87 45.57
ages 40-49 3.495 26.47 30.69 24.83 63.60 18.73 2.228 39.66
Notes: Table shows overall conviction rates (Total) and type of crimes rates conditional on having been convicted at
least once or twice. The sample are men with low SES, and for the age speciﬁc conviction rates only low SES men who
are fully observed for the relevant age bracket are included. Panel A and B: All includes the sample low SES men born
45-55 (N=283,841) and the conviction rates refers to having ever been convicted or having been convicted at least twice
between 1973-2010. Age speciﬁc conviction rates for men in Parent Generation includes: for ages 20-24 cohorts 53-55
(N=80,835), for ages 25-29 cohorts 48-55 (N=212,906), and for ages 30-39, and 40-49 the low SES sample of cohorts
45-55 (N=283,841).
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Table 1.9: Conviction Rates by Age and Types of Crimes for Men Born 52-55
Percent convicted by crime types conditional on being convicted
Total Violent Property Fraud Traﬃc Drugs Sex Others Prison
Panel A: Men born 52-55, all SES, Obs 176,232: at least one conviction
All 38.62 15.94 24.25 18.19 58.49 18.73 1.465 35.36 19.44
ages 20-24 18.65 10.00 25.17 11.77 42.83 17.41 0.432 31.05 16.42
ages 25-29 11.61 11.31 22.87 16.22 38.24 21.35 0.660 28.97 21.32
ages 30-39 12.38 15.83 20.19 19.52 44.28 16.01 1.311 30.17 22.65
ages 40-49 11.30 14.27 13.13 12.50 56.54 9.996 1.486 24.85
Panel B: Men born 52-55, all SES, Obs 176,232: multiple convictions
All 18.88 26.63 38.94 29.72 71.11 27.90 2.278 51.59 34.66
ages 20-24 6.206 18.48 47.47 23.96 51.83 25.90 0.713 47.81 35.51
ages 25-29 3.824 20.92 43.97 31.38 47.97 31.35 0.920 43.78 44.84
ages 30-39 4.422 28.11 40.19 34.09 56.23 28.06 2.027 43.77 45.84
ages 40-49 3.528 25.24 28.95 21.97 64.95 21.83 1.914 40.16
Panel C: Men born 52-55 low SES, Obs. 107,557: at least one conviction
All 40.00 17.36 25.23 18.59 59.14 18.23 1.562 36.30 20.53
ages 20-24 19.79 11.05 25.89 12.20 44.11 16.39 0.456 31.04 17.12
ages 25-29 12.28 12.70 23.29 16.77 39.31 20.55 0.750 29.04 22.46
ages 30-39 13.19 16.92 21.09 19.49 45.00 15.12 1.417 30.42 23.67
ages 40-49 11.56 15.27 14.27 12.86 54.63 10.31 1.496 26.32
Panel D: Men born 52-55, low SES, Obs. 107,557: multiple convictions
All 20.07 28.61 40.10 30.16 71.73 26.66 2.413 52.60 35.95
ages 20-24 6.889 19.77 48.31 24.56 53.62 23.74 0.675 47.46 36.52
ages 25-29 4.192 23.38 44.82 31.96 49.41 29.94 1.042 43.65 46.66
ages 30-39 4.849 29.57 41.30 33.79 56.63 26.63 2.090 44.51 47.40
ages 40-49 3.734 26.54 30.55 22.29 63.99 22.24 1.718 41.46
Notes: Table shows overall conviction rates (Total) and type of crimes rates conditional on having been convicted
at least once or twice. The sample are all men of the Parent Generation born 52-55 with all SES (Panel A and B,
N=176,232) or with low SES (Panel C and D, N=107,557).
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Table 1.10: Conviction Rates by Age and Types of Crimes for Women of Parent
Generation
Percent convicted by crime types conditional on being convicted
Total Violent Property Fraud Traﬃc Drugs Sex Others Prison
Panel A: Women of Parent Generation, all SES: at least one conviction
All 9.084 5.706 26.94 17.81 45.34 13.71 0.0594 15.77 5.766
ages 20-24 3.300 2.608 26.01 16.39 34.19 23.79 0 13.07 2.943
ages 25-29 2.272 3.151 25.61 19.23 32.13 20.10 0.0407 15.61 4.631
ages 30-39 3.070 5.060 28.36 20.32 39.84 10.80 0.0611 14.41 5.457
ages 40-49 2.623 6.469 27.69 15.25 45.40 6.970 0.0626 14.39
Panel B: Women of Parent Generation, low SES: at least one conviction
All 9.008 5.968 27.31 18.93 45.05 13.29 0.0576 15.52 6.149
ages 20-24 3.368 2.747 25.11 16.71 35.13 21.82 0 13.11 2.631
ages 25-29 2.229 3.567 25.55 20.47 32.86 19.39 0.0665 15.02 4.919
ages 30-39 3.118 5.256 28.70 21.72 40.12 10.40 0.0476 13.78 6.029
ages 40-49 2.628 6.674 29.19 16.27 43.35 6.914 0.0564 14.56
Panel C: Women born 52-55 all SES, Obs. 167,588: at least one conviction
All 10.22 5.996 27.42 18.80 45.37 15.99 0.0409 16.21 6.159
ages 20-24 3.210 2.603 25.77 16.38 33.87 23.72 0.0186 13.42 2.956
ages 25-29 2.359 3.542 26.21 22.54 31.93 19.78 0.0253 14.70 5.490
ages 30-39 2.936 6.016 30.55 21.48 41.91 10.30 0.0610 14.47 7.114
ages 40-49 2.604 7.333 26.81 15.03 45.14 9.120 0.0458 16.77
Panel D: Women born 52-55 low SES, Obs. 102,223: at least one conviction
All 10.21 6.350 27.65 19.85 45.10 15.38 0.0479 15.96 6.656
ages 20-24 3.259 2.852 24.95 16.69 34.97 22.16 0.0300 13.12 2.852
ages 25-29 2.300 3.828 26.16 23.99 31.82 19.44 0.0425 14.16 5.700
ages 30-39 3.022 6.280 30.79 23.28 41.73 9.938 0.0324 13.79 8.158
ages 40-49 2.592 7.623 29.02 15.32 42.72 9.585 0.0755 17.28
Notes: Table shows overall conviction rates (Total) and type of crimes rates conditional on having been convicted at
least once or twice for women in the Parent Generation, with all SES or low SES. Panel A and B: only women who
are fully observed for the relevant age bracket are included. All includes the whole sample of women born 45-55 (all
SES N=426,133, low SES N=269,701) and the conviction rates refers to having ever been convicted or having been
convicted at least twice between 1973-2010. Age speciﬁc conviction rates for women in Parent Generation includes: for
ages 20-24 cohorts 53-55 (all SES: N=126,625, low SES: 76,749), for ages 25-29 cohorts 48-55 (all SES: N=324,147, low
SES: 202,430), and for ages 30-39, and 40-49 the whole sample of cohorts 45-55 (all SES: N=426,133, low SES: 269,701).
Panel C and D: all conviction rates inclde only women born 52-55 (all SES: N=167,588, low SES: N=102,223).
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1.8.2 Women and the Reform
Table 1.11: Reform Eﬀects on Crime by Types of Crimes for Women of Parent Gen-
eration
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Any Violent Property Drugs Traﬃc Fraud
Women born 52-55: All SES, Obs: 167,588
Reform 0.389 0.039 -0.209 0.190 0.414* -0.120
(0.315) (0.084) (0.214) (0.135) (0.238) (0.135)
y¯ % 10.22 0.613 2.803 1.634 4.638 1.922
Notes: Signiﬁcance levels *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Results are scaled by
100. The dependent variables are indicator variables for having ever been con-
victed between 1973-2010 for any crime in column (1), or one of the crime types
speciﬁed in columns (2)-(6). Robust standard errors, clustered by municipality
of birth, in parentheses; all regressions include a full set of birth municipality
and birth cohort indicator variables of individual and father's education levels.
Table 1.12: Age Speciﬁc Reform Eﬀects on Crime for Women of the Parent Generation
(1) (2) (3)
Convicted at age: 30-39 25-29 20-24
Women born 52-55, All SES, Obs. 167,588
Reform -0.013 -0.043 0.262
(0.201) (0.166) (0.194)
y¯ % 2.936 2.359 3.210
Notes: Signiﬁcance levels *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *
p<0.1. Results are scaled by 100. The dependent
variables are indicator variables for having ever been
convicted between the ages of 30-39, 25-29, and 20-
24. The sample are women from the parent generation
born 52-55. Robust standard errors, clustered by birth
municipality, in parentheses; all regressions include a
full set of birth municipality and birth cohort indica-
tor variables of the individual, and father's education
levels.
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1.8.3 Parent Estimations Including Trends
Table 1.13: Reform Eﬀects on Years of Schooling for Parent Generation
Dependent variable: Own years of schooling
(1) (2) (3)
Sample: All SES Low SES High SES
Reform 0.216*** 0.309*** 0.080**
(0.033) (0.034) (0.036)
Obs 437,921 278,074 159,847
mean years 11.61 10.90 12.85
Notes: Signiﬁcance levels *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
The dependent variable is number of years of own school-
ing. Robust standard errors, clustered by municipality of
birth, in parentheses; all regressions include a full set of
birth municipality and birth cohort indicator variables of
individual and municipality group speciﬁc cohort trends.
Column (1) includes father's education levels.
Table 1.14: Reform Eﬀects on Crime by Types of Crimes for Parent Generation
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Any Violent Property Drugs Traﬃc Fraud
Panel A: Men born 52-55, All SES, Obs: 175,681
Reform -1.292 -0.525 -1.044* -0.943** -0.559 -1.139***
(0.921) (0.457) (0.558) (0.469) (0.793) (0.383)
y¯ % 38.62 6.160 9.364 7.223 22.58 7.022
Panel B: Men born 52-55, Low SES, Obs: 107,210
Reform -1.495 -0.825 -0.908 -1.309** -0.844 -1.269***
(1.053) (0.865) (0.648) (0.580) (0.950) (0.470)
y¯ % 40.00 6.949 10.10 7.282 23.65 7.433
Notes: Signiﬁcance levels *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Results are scaled by
100. The dependent variables are indicator variables for having ever been convicted
between 1973-2010 for any crime in column (1), or one of the crime types speciﬁed
in columns (2)-(6). Robust standard errors, clustered by municipality of birth, in
parentheses; all regressions include a full set of birth municipality and birth cohort
indicator variables of individual, and municipality of birth group speciﬁc cohort
trends. Panel A includes father's education levels.
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Table 1.15: Age Speciﬁc Reform Eﬀects on Crime for Parent Generation
(1) (2) (3)
Convicted at age: 30-39 25-29 20-24
Panel A: Men born 52-55, All SES, Obs. 175,681
Reform -0.291 -1.261** -1.594**
(0.573) (0.630) (0.711)
y¯ % 12.37 11.61 18.65
Panel B: Men born 52-55, Low SES, Obs. 107,210
Reform -0.691 -1.403* -1.537*
(0.695) (0.739) (0.849)
y¯ % 13.18 12.27 19.79
Notes: Signiﬁcance levels *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Results are scaled by 100. The dependent variables are in-
dicator variables for having ever been convicted between
the ages of 30-39, 25-29, and 20-24. The sample are men
from the parent generation born 52-55. Robust standard
errors, clustered by birth municipality, in parentheses; all
regressions include a full set of birth municipality and birth
cohort indicator variables of the individual, and munici-
pality of birth group speciﬁc cohort trends. Panel A also
includes father's education levels.
Table 1.16: Reform Impact on Prison Sentences for Parent Generations
(1) (2)




y¯ % 7.505 8.206
Notes: Signiﬁcance levels *** p<0.01, **
p<0.05, * p<0.1. Eﬀects scaled by 100. The
dependent variable is an indicator variable for
having ever been convicted for a prison sentence
between 1973-2010. Robust standard errors in
parentheses clustered by own birth municipality.
Includes own birth cohort and birth municipal-
ity indicator variables, and municipality of birth




Intergenerational Eﬀects of Education
Policy on Crime
2.1 Introduction
A strong intergenerational correlation in criminality and the fact that education poli-
cies can aﬀect parental resources as well as skills important for parenting suggests that
education policies could also have intergenerational eﬀects on crime. So far, the ques-
tion if education policies can have such intergenerational eﬀects remains open. There
are good reasons to expect so considering, the intergenerational associations of crimi-
nal behavior documented in the criminology literature. Also, for Sweden Hjalmarsson
and Lindquist (2012) document a strong correlation between crime of fathers and
children of both genders using the Stockholm Birth Cohort Study. A second Swedish
study by Hjalmarsson and Lindquist (2013) uses adoption data to determine factors
through which parents aﬀect criminal behaviour of their children. They document a
strong parent-child correlation in criminal behaviour.
In general, child outcomes will be driven by predetermined parental characteristics
and by the investments parents (and possibly the state) undertake to promote the
child's human capital (see Becker (1981)).1 Cunha, Heckman, and Schennach (2010)
formalize the intergenerational links and show the importance of parental background
and investments for child cognitive and social skill outcomes. An implication of their
results is that improving parental skills will have a direct impact on their children,
1For some evidence on the importance of mother's education on child outcomes see for example
Carneiro, Meghir, and Parey (2013); Deming (forthcoming) highlights the importance of school
quality and it's potential impact on crime.
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while the increased parental resources may increase investments leading to further
intergenerational improvements (see also Cunha (2007) and Caucutt and Lochner
(2012)).
Several theories originating from sociology and social behavior also predict a causal
relationship between family resources and criminal behavior of the oﬀspring. Merton
(1938) suggests that lack of means to fulﬁll culturally deﬁned societal goals may
cause some individuals to reject legitimate means of achieving these goals. Coleman
(1988) stresses the importance of interaction between parental human capital and
other family resources - such as parental attention, control and quality of parent-child
relations - in the formation of child human capital. There is direct evidence that
better childhood environments and early education can reduce crime rates as shown
by the Perry pre-school experiment presented in Schweinhart, Montie, Xiang, Barnett,
Belﬁeld, and Nores (2005) and Cunha and Heckman (2007).
The focus in this chapter is estimating the impact of educational interventions
received by the parents on child crime outcomes. Speciﬁcally, we show that the
Swedish comprehensive school reform, that we showed substantially decreased crime
rates of the target generation, also decreased crime of their children. The reason we
may expect this intergenerational eﬀect is because men aﬀected by the reform attain
higher education levels, have improved cognitive and social skills, earn substantially
more, engage less in criminal activity, and marry higher earning wives.
2.2 Data and Descriptives for Child Generation
The data used for the empirical analysis of the reform eﬀects on the children of those
directly aﬀected by the reform comes from the same data source. Again, we link three
generations in the data: parent, grandparent and children generation. But, in this
chapter the focus lies on crime of the children generation. To reiterate, the children
generation is deﬁned as the sons of men (or women) in the parent generation who were
born between 1945 and 1955. For each son we determine father's (mother's) reform
assignment based on father's (mother's) municipality of birth. The details of the
reform and how we assign reform status to individuals are presented and discussed
in detail in the previous chapter, in Section 1.2. Conviction data for the children
generation is covering the time period between 1973 and 2010 and has been linked
to sons in our data set using the unique personal identifying number. Exploiting the
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details of the crime data we are able to identify seven types of crime categories and
the age when it was committed, and details of the crime data outlined in chapter
1 apply likewise. We deﬁne the main age observation window for sons' convictions
between the ages 15 to 29. We select the sample of sons of men born 1945-1955,
who have reached the age of criminal responsibility (age 15) in 2008. Furthermore,
sons have to be alive in 1973 (when the crime records begin) and have not migrated
permanently out of Sweden. For this sample of sons we are able to match education
information of paternal grandfathers for 61.53 percent from the Swedish National
Education Register. For estimations regarding mother's reform assignment, we select
sons of mothers who were born between 1945 and 1955.
Similarly, to Chapter 1 we ﬁrst report conviction rates for sons in the child gen-
eration. Under the column "Total", Table 2.1 shows the overall conviction rate for
sons of men born 45-55. Again, we also report the conviction rate by type of crime
conditional on being convicted in the remaining columns. Since individuals can have
multiple convictions these columns add up to more than 100. The conviction rates
correspond to the observation period 1973-2010 over the 15-29 age range.
Table 2.1: Conviction Rates by Age and Types of Crimes for All SES
Percent convicted by crime types conditional on being convicted
Total Violent Property Fraud Traﬃc Drugs Sex Others Prison
Panel A: Sons in Child Generation: at least one conviction
All 15-29 23.69 19.23 33.07 12.28 46.03 13.63 0.881 31.18 10.26
ages 15-19 15.83 15.95 39.81 11.40 35.51 7.527 0.518 24.68 2.726
ages 20-24 11.80 17.71 20.59 8.303 41.44 15.48 0.736 30.02 15.30
ages 25-29 7.948 16.27 14.29 8.627 48.89 18.88 0.978 24.73 17.17
Panel B: Sons in Child Generation: multiple convictions
All 15-29 7.456 36.48 57.48 23.06 58.86 27.26 1.264 50.55 24.46
ages 15-19 5.107 30.04 62.42 18.65 45.55 12.84 0.776 39.42 6.943
ages 20-24 3.636 29.90 40.59 16.63 49.04 30.55 0.825 43.73 33.75
ages 25-29 2.387 25 32.70 16.98 56.78 38.89 1.109 37.28 37.98
Notes: Table shows overall conviction rates (Total) and type of crimes rates conditional on having been convicted at
least once or twice. The sample are men with all SES. For the age speciﬁc conviction rates only men who are fully
observed for the relevant age bracket are included. For Panel A and B: All 15-29 includes the whole sample of sons born
in or before 1993 (N=426,721), and the conviction rates refers to having ever been convicted or having been convicted
at least twice between the age 15-29. Sons' conviction rates by age includes: for ages 15-19 the whole sample of sons
(N=426,721), for ages 20-24 cohorts born in or before 1988 (N=380,249), and for ages 25-29 cohorts born in or before
1983 (N=294,749).
About 24 percent of sons in the child generation had a conviction in our observation
age window of 15-29. Conditional on a conviction there are substantial numbers
convicted of violent and property crimes as well as traﬃc crimes. The Table also
reports conviction rates by age. Comparing the crime rates at the same ages with
that of the parent generation in Table 1.9 we see a very large decline in crime across
the generations. For both generations most oﬀenses are committed by the younger
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individuals. Figure 2.1 shows crime age proﬁles for sons. As for the parent generation,
sons crime age proﬁles show a pronounced decline of crime with age. Interestingly,
there are very strong cohort eﬀects on crime for the child generation, showing a marked
decline over time.
Figure 2.1: Age Proﬁle of Crime Rate for the Child Generation by Cohort
Column (7) and the bottom Panel of Table 2.1 provides information on more
serious criminal activity, namely convictions leading to prison and multiple (2+) con-
victions, as well as the percent convicted of each type of crime conditional on having
2+ convictions. The distribution by type of crime involves more violent, property and
fraud crime, although traﬃc related crimes are also prevalent. About 10 percent of
those convicted in the child generation were incarcerated (over the 15-29 age range).
Moreover, when we consider multiple convictions the prevalence of violent, fraud and
property crimes increases.
2.2.1 Parental Background, Education and Crime
We now move on to document the intergenerational correlation between parental
education and crime, and father's crime and son's crime. Table 2.2 shows the results
from regressing conviction (columns 1 and 3) and incarceration (columns 2 and 4) on
father's and mother's education based on a Linear Probability Model. All regressions
include dummies for the municipality of birth of the father and cohort eﬀects.
One year of own schooling for men in the parent generation is associated with a
decrease of the probability of a conviction by 2.5 percentage points corresponding to
a 7.4 percent reduction in conviction rates. For the child generation (and including
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Table 2.2: Association Between Own and Parental Education and Crime
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Men born 45-55 Sons of parents born 45-55
Conviction Prison Conviction Prison
Own Schooling -2.496*** -0.998*** -4.246*** -0.754***
(0.114) (0.059) (0.036) (0.020)
Father's Schooling -0.218*** -0.038***
(0.033) (0.012)
Mother's Schooling -0.087** -0.029***
(0.040) (0.010)
Obs 444,272 444,272 273,093 273,093
y¯ % 33.88 6.597 24.48 2.371
Notes: Signiﬁcance levels *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Eﬀects scaled by 100. Dependent
variables for men born 45-55: indicator variables for having ever been convicted or having re-
ceived a prison sentence between 1973-2010. Dependent variables for sons: indicator variables
for having ever been convicted or having received a prison sentence between the ages 15-29.
Robust standard errors in parentheses clustered by own birth municipality or by father's birth
municipality. Includes own birth cohort and birth municipality indicator variables, or father's
cohort and father's birth municipality indicator variables.
parental education) the coeﬃcient on own education increases substantially for convic-
tion, but less for incarceration. Both father's and mother's education are signiﬁcant
but the impact of the former is larger.
Table 2.3: Association Between Son's and Father's Crime
(1) (2) (3) (4)
All SES Low SES
Convict Prison Convict Prison
Panel A: Fathers born 45-55 and their sons born before 1994
Father convict/prison 12.503*** 6.205*** 12.895*** 6.699***
(0.187) (0.168) (0.215) (0.235)
Obs 410,475 410,475 261,918 261,918
y¯ % 23.54 2.380 25.09 2.682
Panel B: Fathers born 53-55 (ages 20-29), sons born before 1982 (ages 20-29)
Father convict/prison at ages 20-29 12.000*** 9.073*** 12.457*** 10.086***
(0.627) (0.772) (0.635) (0.998)
Obs 37,006 37,006 24,956 24,956
y¯ % 18.42 3.437 18.94 3.614
Notes: Signiﬁcance levels *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Eﬀects scaled by 100. The dependent variables
are indicator variables for sons having been convicted or sentenced to prison between the ages 15-29 in
Panel A, and between the ages 20-29 in Panel B. Robust standard errors in parentheses clustered by father's
birth municipality. Includes father's cohort, sons' cohort and father's birth municipality indicator variables.
Finally, Table 2.3 illustrates the intergenerational associations of crime. The prob-
ability of ever being convicted increases by over 12 percentage points if the father has
been convicted. The father having been jailed is associated with a 6 percentage point
increase in the probability that the son will go to prison too. These associations do
not change much when we take just low SES individuals.
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In interpreting these results there is an issue with the alignment of ages across gen-
erations as pointed out by Haider and Solon (2006) in the context of intergenerational
mobility of income. So in Panel B we present the intergenerational association for
ages 20-29 for both generations, controlling for cohort eﬀects for both. For the con-
viction rates the intergenerational associations are essentially the same when we align
ages in this way. However, for prison they increase by 50 percent. Though, the in-
escapable conclusion from these results is that there is a very strong intergenerational
association of crime and incarceration.
2.3 Empirical Strategy
The main outcome variables in this chapter for the children generation are whether
a son was ever convicted during the observation window 1973-2010 over the 15-29
age range for any crime and by type of crime; and whether a son was convicted at
certain ages 15-19, 20-24 and 25-29. Again, we present results for the whole sample
and separately for those with a low SES background.
For the child generation we observe the criminal history from the age 15, when
criminal responsibility begins and crimes are recorded according to Swedish law. We
follow them until the age of 29. This allows us to measure the eﬀects on the most
important part of the criminal lifecycle. The child generation all attend the same
schooling system because the reform had been rolled out nationally at that point.
The only diﬀerence is that for some the fathers also attended the new system, while
for others they did not. The children of both treated and untreated fathers live in
the same labor market areas and their fathers belong to all the cohorts 1945-55 of the
transitional period. We also explore the impact of exposing females to the reform on
the crime rate of their sons.
As mentioned in the previous chapter the reform was not randomized. We control
for potential diﬀerences across treatment and control municipalities using a diﬀerence
in diﬀerences approach, just as we did for the parent generation. This section will
highlight the estimation strategy followed for the children generation. We compare
the change in son's crime across father's cohorts in municipalities that implemented
the reform for the younger cohort of father's but not the older one to the change
in crime rate across the same cohorts of father's living in municipalities where there
was no change in policy for these same cohorts. In practice we do this for all 11
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father's cohorts in our window and all 1000 or so father's birth municipalities. Thus
our approach is best described by the regression,











where y˜ci,m,t is the latent child crime "intensity" outcome observed for son i in the
child generation whose father was born in municipality m and in birth cohort t. A
conviction corresponds to y˜ci,m,t > 0. R
f
i,m,t is the reform indicator, which equals one
if the father of son i belongs to a municipality and cohort that has been assigned to
the new school system; tfi is a vector of indicator variables indicating to which cohort
the father of son i belongs to and M fi is a vector of indicator variables indicating in
which municipality the father of son i was born. i,m,t is conditionally independent of
Rfi,m,t. Both the general assumptions underlying the method as discussed in Chapter
1, and the reasoning for the chosen estimation procedure as explained in Chapter 1
apply.
2.4 The Reform and Crime in the Child Generation
The reform can only have an eﬀect through the parents having been aﬀected because
at this time all children were attending the new school system. For these estimations
we take all the sons of fathers born between 1945-55, some of whom will have been
exposed to the reform and others not. This is a broader group than the one we used
to estimate the impacts on the parent generation: while we do not observe the older
parents cohorts at a young enough age to estimate impacts of the reform on their
crime rates we can certainly use their exposure to the reform to measure the impact
on children.
In Table 2.4 we show the impact of the reform on the probability of conviction in
the child generation for any age between the ages of 15-29 inclusive. The ﬁrst column
shows the results for the entire sample and columns 2 through 4 show the eﬀect in
diﬀerent age groups, separately. Panel B in the table shows the results for those whose
fathers were born in low SES homes.
The overall result is a highly signiﬁcant reduction in criminality of 0.78 percentage
points (pp) in the child generation. The point estimate is similar, and also signiﬁcant,
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Table 2.4: Age Speciﬁc Reform Eﬀects on Son's Crime
(1) (2) (3) (3)
Convicted at age: 15-29 15-19 20-24 25-29
Cohorts observed: 1960-1993 1960-1993 1960-1988 1960-1983
Panel A: All SES
Reform father -0.779*** -0.589*** -0.314 -0.107
(0.257) (0.210) (0.203) (0.186)
Obs 410,476 410,476 365,782 283,297
y¯ % 23.54 15.70 11.69 7.861
Panel B: Low SES
Reform father -0.667** -0.567** -0.196 0.210
(0.326) (0.267) (0.249) (0.238)
Obs 261,918 261,918 236,289 187,515
y¯ % 25.09 16.81 12.44 8.255
Notes: Signiﬁcance levels *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Results are scaled
by 100. The dependent variables are indicator variables for having ever been
convicted between the ages of 15-29, 15-19, 20-24 or 25-29. The sample are sons
of men born 45-55 who are fully observed for the relevant age bracket of the de-
pendent variable. Robust standard errors, clustered by father's municipality of
birth, in parentheses; all regressions include a full set of father's birth municipal-
ity and father's birth cohort indicator variables. Panel A includes grandfather's
education levels.
in the group originating from low SES families. The division of the sample by age
groups shows that the eﬀect is largest for the younger (15-19) age group and declines
for older groups.
Table 2.5: Reform Eﬀects on Son's Crime by Type of Crimes
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Convicted at age 15-29: Violent Property Drugs Traﬃc Fraud
Panel A: All SES, Obs 410,476
Reform father -0.243** -0.019 0.095 -0.446** -0.224**
(0.121) (0.158) (0.110) (0.178) (0.097)
y¯ % 4.485 7.736 3.182 10.82 2.877
Panel B: Low SES, Obs 261,918
Reform father -0.108 0.022 0.081 -0.444* -0.233*
(0.163) (0.203) (0.139) (0.238) (0.120)
y¯ % 4.946 8.406 3.199 11.86 3.109
Notes: Signiﬁcance levels *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Results are scaled by 100.
The dependent variables are indicator variables for having ever been convicted between
the ages of 15-29 for one of the speciﬁed crime types. Robust standard errors, clustered by
father's municipality of birth, in parentheses; all regressions include a full set of father's birth
municipality and father's birth cohort indicator variables. Panel A includes grandfather's
education levels.
Table 2.5 splits up the eﬀect by type of crime. Such analysis is important because
diﬀerent types of crime have a diﬀerent social cost and may have diﬀerent underlying
motivations, which in turn is suggestive about the way the reform aﬀected crime
outcomes. We see that the eﬀects that dominate are the reduction of violent crime,
traﬃc and fraud each by about 0.24-0.45pp. Interestingly, property and drugs crime
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seem unaﬀected with the estimates being eﬀectively zero. Focusing on the low SES
group does not change these conclusions.
Table 2.6: Reform Eﬀects on Son's Recidivism and Incarceration
Dependent variables: Multiple convictions/Recidivism Incarceration
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Convicted at age: 15-29 15-19 20-24 25-29 15-29
Cohorts observed: 1960-1993 1960-1993 1960-1988 1960-1983 1960-1993
Panel A: All SES
Reform father -0.267 -0.183 -0.134 -0.154 -0.087
(0.172) (0.129) (0.120) (0.108) (0.092)
Obs 410,476 410,476 365,782 283,297 410,286
y¯ % 7.343 5.033 3.570 2.337 2.380
Panel B: Low SES
Reform father -0.166 -0.186 -0.056 0.001 0.009
(0.225) (0.172) (0.148) (0.163) (0.124)
Obs 261,918 261,918 236,289 187,515 261,918
y¯ % 8.077 5.542 3.924 2.505 2.682
Notes: Signiﬁcance levels *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Results are scaled by 100. The dependent
variables are indicator variables for having been convicted at least twice between the ages of 15-29,
15-19, 20-24 or 25-29, or an indicator variable for having ever been convicted for a prison sentence
between the ages 15-29. The sample are sons of men born 45-55 who are fully observed for the relevant
age bracket of the dependent variable. Robust standard errors, clustered by father's municipality of
birth, in parentheses; all regressions include a full set of father's birth municipality and father's birth
cohort indicator variables. Panel A includes grandfather's education levels.
The reform also increased schooling for women, albeit a bit less. However, as we
show in Appendix Tables 2.10 and 2.11 there is no eﬀect of exposing the mother to
the reform on the criminal activity of male children.
We now turn to the impacts on recidivism and incarceration. For recidivism, Table
2.6 shows the eﬀects are small and overall they are signiﬁcant only at the 12 percent
level. For the child generation the incarceration rate for the 15-29 age group is 2.4
percent over the age window we observe. We again experimented with a probit using
the ﬁxed eﬀects based on the ﬁrst father cohort for which the reform was implemented
in the municipality; as for the parents this probit for sons gave identical results to the
LPM, which we report here. The results are presented in the last column of Table
2.6 and show that the coeﬃcients are small and not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero,
although they are quite precisely estimated. Both recidivism and incarceration are
very low in the child generation and perhaps it is not surprising that we do not observe
any eﬀects, since these may be really the hardened oﬀenders.
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2.5 Common Trends Assumption
One of the key identifying assumptions of our approach is that the underlying trends in
crime are the same irrespective of the birth municipality of the parent generation. We
now bring to bear evidence for this assumption in three diﬀerent ways: ﬁrst, we repeat
our estimation assuming that the reform took place at a diﬀerent date than it actually
did (placebo estimations); second, we explicitly include municipality speciﬁc trends
to evaluate whether they are signiﬁcant (akin to a test of overidentifying restrictions)
and whether our results are sensitive to their inclusion; third, we plot residuals to
show that they do not display a trend. For these tests we group municipalities by the
earliest cohort for which they implemented the reform and we look for omitted trends
speciﬁc to each of these groups.
For the placebo estimations, where we pretend that the reform was implemented
later, we only use the sample of sons whose fathers were treated by the reform. To
construct placebo treatment and control groups we then pretend that the reform was
implemented successively one year later, two years, three years, etc. We (falsely)
assign the ﬁrst treated cohort (the ﬁrst two treated cohorts, the ﬁrst three treated
cohorts, etc.) in each municipality group to be untreated and the remaining ones to
the treated group. This provides ﬁve placebo estimates.
Similarly, for the placebo estimations where we pretend that the reform was imple-
mented earlier, we restrict the sample to sons whose fathers were not treated by the
reform.2 The placebo treatment groups are deﬁned by (falsely) assigning the two last
untreated cohorts (the three last untreated cohorts, the four last untreated cohorts,
etc.) to the treated group and the remaining cohorts stay in the control group. This
provides an additional ﬁve placebo estimates.
The results are all brought together in Figure 2.2. Each dot represents the estimate
assuming the reform took place at the speciﬁed period on the x-axis (relative to when
it actually took place, which is the zero point). The vertical line around the dot
represents the 95 percent conﬁdence interval. The graph shows that the largest (in
absolute value) and only signiﬁcant eﬀect is obtained when we use the correct timing
for the reform assignment (that is at zero). In all other cases we estimate insigniﬁcant
eﬀects and no particular pattern shows up implying there is nothing systematic taking
2We require at least two treated cohorts and one untreated cohort in each municipality group
to implement the estimator. This means that we start our ﬁrst placebo estimation pretending the
reform was implemented two years earlier than it actually was.
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Figure 2.2: Placebo Estimations Sons
place biasing the results towards an eﬀect on crime.
For our second approach, Table 2.7 shows F-statistics and p-values for two tests:
that the trends are not speciﬁc to groups of municipalities (sorted by cohort of ﬁrst im-
plementation) and that the impacts remain unaﬀected by the inclusion of such trends.
For the child generation we ﬁnd no evidence that such speciﬁc trends are present for
the overall sample. While, the trends for the child generation of those from lower SES
backgrounds are however marginally signiﬁcant (p-value 4.4 percent). Nevertheless,
as is clear from columns (3) and (4) in this table, this marginal signiﬁcance does not
translate to a signiﬁcant eﬀect on the impacts. For example, the overall eﬀect without
any municipality speciﬁc trends is -0.779 (se 0.257) while when we include trends this
becomes -0.800 (se 0.276). For the lower SES group the eﬀect drops a bit from -0.667
(se 0.326) to -0.571 (se 0.356). The parameter estimates obtained when these trends
are included are shown in the Appendix in Table 2.12. None of these changes are sig-
niﬁcant. There is no change in terms of precision for the child generation, which is in
contrast to the loss in precision for the parent generation when including trends. This
is probably because we cover the children of all relevant parental cohorts (1945-55)
and the sample size is much larger than in our parent sample.
Table 2.7: Trends Tests for Child Generation
Tests: Joint test of trends=0 Reform parameter across models
(1) (2) (3) (4)
All SES Low SES All SES Low SES
F/chi2 statistic 1.235 1.665 0.0338 0.320
P-value 0.230 0.0436 0.854 0.571
Notes: Test 1 jointly tests the hypothesis that trends are common across municipali-
ties. Test 2 tests the hypothesis that the impacts are the same when comparing the
speciﬁcation with and without trends.
Turning now to a graphical representation, in Figure 2.3 we plot the residuals from
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sons' diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences regressions (with the estimated average impact on sons
crime added back in) grouped by years to implementation. Each point corresponds
to an average residual across fathers cohorts in diﬀerent municipalities grouped by
their years to implementation.3 If there are systematic trends in sons crime related
to early or late implementing municipalities these would show up as a trend in these
residuals because the composition of municipalities changes as we move along the x-
axis to diﬀerent times to implementation. However, these residuals display no trend:
the pre-implementation trend is -0.0025 and the post implementation one is zero
to 4 decimal points. This completes what we view as conclusive evidence that the
results we present on the intergenerational impacts of the reform are robust and not
a spurious artifact of other events in the data.
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2.5.1 Municipality Characteristics and Exogeneity of the Re-
form
The ﬁxed eﬀects approach controls for permanent confounding diﬀerences in the mu-
nicipalities that implemented the reform for diﬀerent cohorts. However, if there are
important time varying characteristics that are correlated with crime rates this could
3For example if municipality 1 implemented the reform for the 1948 cohort, this cohort would
contribute to the zero point on the graph, the 1947 cohort contributes to -1 and so on. Going
forward 1949 would contribute to +1, 1950 to +2 etc. This is repeated for all municipalities by
time to implementation. The residuals are then averaged by this time to implementation because
presenting these trends one by one is too noisy to be visually informative.
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lead to biases. In our empirical work we already control for one such variable namely
the education level of the grandparent generation which can be correlated with the
crime rates of the child generation (or the parent generation in Chapter 1). Indeed
this variable is signiﬁcant and when we include it the overall estimated impact of the
reform on crime increases (from -0.5 to -0.78). The various tests of diﬀerential trends
should have power against other omitted time varying characteristics. The fact that
these tests have supported the robustness of our results corroborates our assumption
that the reform can be taken to be conditionally exogenous.
2.5.2 Discussion
The Swedish educational reform reduced the crime rates of men of both the direct
subjects of the reform (the parent generation) as well as that of their sons. For the
parent generation the impacts are driven by a reduction in property crimes and those
traﬃc crimes serious enough to lead to a court appearance. Violent and drug-related
crimes remained unaﬀected. The reform also had a large impact on repeated crime
for men. The crime rate of women, which was already much lower was not aﬀected.
For the child generation the impacts are driven by declines in fraud (including tax
evasion) as well as violent crime and traﬃc oﬀenses. Thus, the impact relates both
to crimes with a clear economic motivation (fraud) as well as to crimes relating more
to anti-social behavior (violent, traﬃc). These results relate to the case where the
father was exposed to the reform. When instead we consider the impact of treating
the mother we ﬁnd no impact on the child generation, despite the fact that the years
of education increased for women as well.
The persistence of the eﬀects of this educational policy across generations puts
a diﬀerent perspective on the value of such reforms. However, understanding the
mechanisms through which the reform achieved these eﬀects is complicated by the
multiple possible channels. In Table 2.8 we present impacts on a number of outcomes
as information to help understand the channels that operated. We do not, however,
claim to oﬀer conclusive evidence on mechanisms. After all we only have one discrete
source of variation.
For the men of the parent generation, who were the direct subjects of the re-
form, theory points to the improved economic opportunities in the legal labor market
resulting from increased education as a key factor leading to a reduction in crime
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participation (see e.g. Becker (1981), Freeman (1999)). In fact, human capital and
economic opportunity did improve as a result of the reform: educational attainment
increased and as reported in Meghir, Palme, and Simeonova (2013) the reform led
to a 0.12 of a standard deviation (se 0.044) increase in cognitive skills for those with
low education fathers. Moreover, as shown in Table 2.8, the reform translated to
higher earnings for the parent generation.4 This in itself increases the opportunity
cost of crime. Meghir, Palme, and Simeonova (2013) also report an increase in the
armed forces social skills indicator of 17 percent of a standard deviation (se 0.077) as
a result of this reform;5 interestingly this increase in social skills is driven mainly by
those from a higher SES background for whom the social skills indicator increased by
0.53 of a standard deviation (se 0.198). This demonstrates that the reform aﬀected all
groups. We know from Heckman, Stixrud, and Urzua (2006) that an improvement in
cognitive and social skills reduces antisocial and risky behavior and improves earnings.
The reduction in criminality we observe here is consistent with this.
A decline in crime and an improvement in the cognitive and social skills in the
parent generation can induce directly a reduction in crime in the child generation
through better parenting practices. Moreover, there was an increase in parental re-
sources both because fathers' earnings increased and because fathers exposed to the
reform had children with women who earn more (about $820 per annum measured
in 2004) and who are marginally less likely to be unemployed.6 Taken together and
assuming that child investments are driven by life-time income these results imply
an increase in resources available for child investments. Moreover, fertility does not
increase and hence these increased resources do not get diluted. Having children as a
teen also declined but from a very low base: the table shows a 0.263 percentage point
decline from a baseline of 1.7 percent of fathers having a child while being teens.
Taken together, the evidence points towards increased resources at the home and
improved parental quality, which should lead to better upbringing for the children.
This is consistent with reductions in criminal activity of the child generation.
4This is consistent with Meghir and Palme (2005).
5The test is administered to army conscripts. Military service was compulsory in Sweden at that
time
6For this impact we use levels since some women have zero earnings. We do not condition on
whether the couple is married or not; we just use information on who is the mother of the child. It
is interesting to note that we have not found any direct evidence that female earnings increased as
a result of the reform. So this result indicates an improvement in matches for men treated by the
reform and not just a mechanical eﬀect that men are having children with younger women in the
locality and who are treated as a result.
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Table 2.8: Impact of the Reform on Further Outcome Variables in Both Generations
(1) (2)
All SES Low SES
Panel A: Men born 45-55
Log annual earnings × 100 6.4** 6.9***
(3.0) (2.4)
Ever had a child × 100 -0.093 -0.096
(0.185) (0.273)
Number of children -0.004 0.001
(0.007) (0.010)
Age at birth ﬁrst child 0.106 0.064
(0.075) (0.048)
Child born while a teen × 100 -0.263** -0.210**
(0.106) (0.100)
Spouse education 0.0499 0.0274
(0.061) (0.0274)
Spouse annual earnings in SEK 5,462** 4,829
(2,672) (3,361)
Spouse unemployed -0.003*** -0.0006
(0.001) (0.001)
Panel B: Sons of men born 45-55
Years of schooling (measured at age 25) -0.002 -0.0001
(0.017) (0.021)
Disposable income (measured at age 25) x 100 0.084 -0.472
(0.401) (0.503)
Notes: Signiﬁcance levels *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Each row corresponds to a
separate speciﬁcation, estimating the reform impacts on the dependent variables speciﬁed.
We use the level of spousal earnings instead of the log to accommodate zeros when the
spouse is not working. Disposable income is deﬁned as the sum of incomes from capital,
labor, income security programs and allowances minus all income taxes. Robust standard
errors clustered at the birth municipality of individual (Panel A) or birth municipality
of father (Panel B). All estimations include birth cohort and birth municipality indicator
variables (Panel A), or father's birth cohort and father's birth municipality indicator
variables (Panel B).
A possible puzzle in these results is that the reform does not lead to improvements
in other outcomes in the child generation: as can be seen in Table 2.8, the children of
those who went through the reform did not attain higher levels of education relative to
those with untreated fathers. Moreover, the eﬀect on earnings at 25 is also zero. The
educational result is in general conﬁrmed by those obtained by Holmlund, Lindhal,
and Plug (2011).7
In interpreting these results it is important to note that low ability individuals are
7Lundborg, Nilsson, and Rooth (2012) use an IV strategy to estimate the eﬀect of years of
schooling on a number of outcomes for the child generation. They do ﬁnd a number of signiﬁcant
eﬀects, particularly of mother's schooling. However, their results depend on the validity of using the
reform as an exclusion restriction. They do not report the reduced form eﬀect of the reform other
than on schooling.
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likely to be constrained by the compulsory schooling laws and may not be willing to
invest one whole extra year of education. Indeed, when we estimated a simple quantile
regression for the 25th percentile of schooling we found that the intergenerational
persistence between the child and the parent generation was signiﬁcantly higher when
the father had gone through the reform. This reﬂects the fact that the children were
constrained by the compulsory schooling laws. At the 75th percentile there was no
eﬀect of the reform on intergenerational persistence. Still we could observe an eﬀect
on earnings. However, the negotiated minimum wages prevalent in Sweden may be
masking any subtle improvements at the bottom of the distribution.8
Thus, despite the lack of eﬀects in these other dimensions, human capital may
have increased suﬃciently at the lower part of the distribution to induce a reduction
in crime. In addition, the propensity to commit crimes does not only depend on human
capital, but also relates broadly to the psychic costs of crime, such as moral values
and other personal preferences, including attitudes to risk. These characteristics are
hard to measure directly, but are likely to be aﬀected by home environments and
parental resources.
2.6 Conclusions
This chapter considers the intergenerational eﬀects of educational policy on crime. In
Chapter 1, we ﬁrst conﬁrmed that a Swedish educational reform of the 1950s which
increased compulsory schooling and abolished tracking reduced crime substantially.
This is consistent with results found for the US and the UK.
The new question addressed in this chapter is whether exposing fathers to the
reform has an impact on the crime rates of the next generation, given that all the
children are in any case educated under the new reformed system. The reason we
may expect this to happen is because of improved parental human capital, which may
translate to better parenting and greater availability of resources as indeed is the case.
Our results establish substantial impacts of father's exposure to the reform on
the child generation crime rates: it resulted in an overall decline in the crime rate
by about 0.8 percentage points, mostly driven by a decline in convictions among the
15-19 year olds. The reductions are mainly concentrated among violent crime, traﬃc
8We do not have at our disposal measures of cognition for this cohort yet although we hope to
obtain them.
52
crime (serious enough to lead to a court case) and fraud - including tax evasion. We
are not able to conclusively establish the mechanisms that led to such a reduction. We
are, however, able to establish that home environments for children in families where
the father was exposed to the reform improved in a number of dimensions. That
these improvements led to a reduction in criminality of their children is consistent
with both theories of intergenerational transmission of human capital (see e.g. Becker
and Tomes, 1979, or Cuhna and Heckman, 2007) as well as sociological theories on
the eﬀect of strains (see Merton (1938)) and formation of social capital (see Coleman
(1988)).
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2.7 Appendix - Chapter 2
2.7.1 Additional Descriptive Statistics - Children
Table 2.9: Conviction Rates by Age and Type of Crimes Conditional on Being Con-
victed for Low SES Sons
Percent convicted by crime types conditional on being convicted
Total Violent Property Fraud Traﬃc Drugs Sex Others Prison
Panel A: Sons of Child Generation, low SES: at least one conviction
All 15-29 25.23 19.90 33.74 12.48 47.32 12.91 0.918 31.37 10.86
ages 15-19 16.95 16.29 40.40 11.34 36.90 6.993 0.562 24.34 2.907
ages 20-24 12.54 18.31 21.22 8.607 42.05 14.50 0.747 30.26 16.15
ages 25-29 8.344 17.06 14.96 8.875 48.42 18.33 0.996 25.27 17.58
Panel B: Sons of Child Generation, low SES: multiple convictions
All 15-29 8.203 37.16 58.13 23.57 60.01 25.99 1.358 50.63 25.20
ages 15-19 5.625 30.21 63.11 18.84 46.85 12.18 0.837 38.90 7.275
ages 20-24 4.002 30.29 41.21 17.11 49.69 28.72 0.937 43.94 34.26
ages 25-29 2.556 25.96 33.76 17.63 56.35 38.03 1.145 37.87 38.67
Notes: Table shows overall conviction rates (Total) and type of crimes rates conditional on having been convicted at
least once or twice. The sample are men with low SES, and for the age speciﬁc conviction rates only low SES men
who are fully observed for the relevant age bracket are included. For Panel A and B: All 15-29 includes the low SES
sample of sons born in or before 1993 (N=271,971), and the conviction rates refers to having ever been convicted or
having been convicted at least twice between the age 15-29. Sons' conviction rates by age includes low SES sons: for
ages 15-19 the whole low SES sample of sons (N=271,971), for ages 20-24 cohorts born in or before 1988 (N=245,342),
and for ages 25-29 cohorts born in or before 1983 (N=194,854).
2.7.2 Mother's Reform Eﬀects on Crime
Table 2.10: Age Speciﬁc Reform Eﬀects of Mothers on Son's Crime
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Convicted at age: 15-29 15-19 20-24 25-29
Cohorts observed: 1960-1993 1960-1993 1960-1988 1960-1983
Panel A: All SES
Reform mother -0.078 0.123 0.029 0.129
(0.337) (0.247) (0.200) (0.190)
Obs 429,114 429,114 406,408 347,811
y¯ % 25.65 16.81 12.41 8.053
Panel B: Low SES
Reform mother 0.092 0.259 0.202 0.319
(0.358) (0.277) (0.265) (0.227)
Obs 275,501 275,501 263,373 230,812
y¯ % 27.18 17.79 13.28 8.481
Notes: Signiﬁcance levels *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Results are scaled
by 100. The dependent variables are indicator variables for having ever been
convicted between the ages of 15-29, 15-19, 20-24 or 25-29. The sample are sons
of women born 45-55 who are fully observed for the relevant age bracket of the
dependent variable. Robust standard errors, clustered by mother's municipal-
ity of birth, in parentheses; all regressions include a full set of mother's birth
municipality and mother's birth cohort indicator variables. Panel A includes
grandfather's education levels.
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Table 2.11: Reform Eﬀects of Mothers on Son's Crime by Type of Crimes
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Convicted at age 15-29: Violent Property Drugs Traﬃc Fraud
Panel A: All SES, Obs 429,114
Reform mother 0.124 0.288 0.016 -0.049 -0.012
(0.110) (0.191) (0.100) (0.203) (0.097)
y¯ % 4.628 8.631 3.122 12.29 3.352
Panel B: Low SES, Obs 275,501
Reform mother 0.117 0.539** 0.095 -0.092 0.124
(0.144) (0.228) (0.130) (0.247) (0.112)
y¯ % 5.053 9.230 3.111 13.42 3.572
Notes: Signiﬁcance levels *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Results are scaled by 100.
The dependent variables are indicator variables for having ever been convicted between
the ages of 15-29 for one of the speciﬁed crime types. Robust standard errors, clustered
by mother's municipality of birth, in parentheses; all regressions include a full set of
mother's birth municipality and mother's birth cohort indicator variables. Panel A
includes grandfather's education levels.
2.7.3 Children Crime Estimations Including Trends
Table 2.12: Age Speciﬁc Reform Eﬀects on Son's Crime
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Convicted at age: 15-29 15-19 20-24 25-29
Cohorts observed: 1960-1993 1960-1993 1960-1988 1960-1983
Panel A: All SES
Reform father -0.800*** -0.632*** -0.345* -0.196
(0.276) (0.221) (0.197) (0.208)
Obs 409,083 409,083 364,521 282,305
y¯ % 23.53 15.69 11.69 7.863
Panel B: Low SES
Reform father -0.571 -0.481* -0.244 0.104
(0.356) (0.289) (0.263) (0.269)
Obs 261,014 261,014 235,478 186,858
y¯ % 25.09 16.81 12.44 8.259
Notes: Signiﬁcance levels *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Results are scaled by
100. The dependent variables are indicator variables for having ever been con-
victed between the ages of 15-29, 15-19, 20-24 or 25-29. The sample are sons of
men born 45-55 who are fully observed for the relevant age bracket of the depen-
dent variable. Robust standard errors, clustered by father's municipality of birth,
in parentheses; all regressions include a full set of father's birth municipality and
father's birth cohort indicator variables. In addition all estimations include fa-
ther's cohort trends that are speciﬁc to father's birth municipality group. Panel
A includes grandfather's education levels.
55
Table 2.13: Reform Eﬀects on Prison Sentences for Sons
(1) (2)
Sons of men 45-55: All SES Low SES
Reform father -0.015 0.108
(0.099) (0.138)
Obs 408,021 261,014
y¯ % 2.385 2.683
Notes: Signiﬁcance levels *** p<0.01, **
p<0.05, * p<0.1. Eﬀects scaled by 100. The
dependent variable for is an indicator variable
for having ever been convicted for a prison sen-
tence between the ages 15-29. Robust stan-
dard errors in parentheses clustered by father's
birth municipality. Includes father's cohort and
father's birth municipality indicator variables,
and father's birth municipality speciﬁc cohort




Alcohol Policy and Crime-Age
Proﬁles
3.1 Introduction
In order to understand the drivers of criminal behaviour alcohol consumption has
been identiﬁed as one important contributing factor for example to promote violent
crimes. In the US the Bureau of Justice Statistics (2004) reports that 33 percent of
state prisoners reported to have been under the inﬂuence of alcohol at the time of the
oﬀence in 2004, with even higher shares reporting alcohol inﬂuence for violent crimes
and public disorder. The Crime Survey for England and Wales (2013) reports that
47 percent of victims of violent incidents perceived their oﬀender(s) to be under the
inﬂuence of alcohol, with similar rates since 2001. Around the world governments
have identiﬁed the important role that alcohol plays for criminal activity and alcohol
policies have become the focus of a wide range of crime prevention policies. In the
US minimum legal drinking age laws are hotly debated. Opponents to these laws
argue that a reduction in the age-cut oﬀ would reduce consumption and crime, while
proponents provide evidence in the other direction (Carpenter and Dobkin (2011)). In
recent years laws on driving under the inﬂuence has seen major changes in the US and
Europe. Finally, laws governing mandatory opening hours of bars, restaurants and
nightclubs as well as retail stores are also popular policy instruments. This chapter
focuses on a liberalization of alcohol stores in Sweden.
Sweden is traditionally very strict on alcohol regulation with a state owned alcohol
monopoly regulating all alcohol retail sales and high alcohol taxes. Alcohol policies
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driven by public health and crime prevention concerns are not news there. Already in
1981 the closing of the state owned alcohol monopoly stores on weekends was driven
by such concerns. The return to more liberalized opening hours in 2000-2001 could
be seen in the light of more recent policies that aim to reduce alcohol consumption
by liberalization. One such example of a major liberalization of alcohol policy with
the intention to directly reduce crime and public disorder, is the UK Licensing Act
(2003). Though its eﬀect on alcohol and crime (Hough and Hunter (2008)) and on
actual opening hours (Humphreys and Eisner (2010)) are still debated. In this policy
debate arguments for a liberalization of alcohol policy, such as liberalized opening
hours and licenses, opposes more traditional policies that restrict the access to alcohol
partly (blue laws) or completely (MLDA). Up to date there is no consensus on whether
stricter or more liberal policies are more eﬀective in reducing consumption and crime.
Overall, the existing literature has often focused on one or two types of crimes to
evaluate an alcohol policy, sometimes only considering a narrow age bracket, or crime
in the aggregate. Evidence on the well established age-crime proﬁles shows that crime
varies substantially across ages and types of crimes which implies that the eﬀects of
alcohol on crime are likely to vary by age and types of crimes too (Farrington (1986),
Moﬃtt (1993), and Sampson and Laub (2003)).
In this chapter, I exploit a temporal liberalization of alcohol availability in Sweden
to analyse how crime changes by age and type of crime. In 2000-2001 the Swedish
government performed a policy experiment that expanded opening hours of the alcohol
monopoly stores to open on Saturdays. This expansion corresponds to an increase of
the amount of hours by 12.5 percent. In my empirical analysis, I use individual register
data on the universe of all criminal convictions in Sweden to determine changes in
the crime-age proﬁle induced by those liberalized weekend opening hours. The data
enables me to get a more complete picture on overall crime - for all ages and a broad
range of types of crimes.
The primary data source used in this study are individual register conviction data
covering all convictions in Sweden between 1973-2010. For each individual conviction
in Sweden during that time the data has an individual identiﬁer, the age of the oﬀender
at the time of the oﬀence, the date of the conviction, and the date of crime committed,
regional court identiﬁers, the number of crimes within each individual conviction, and
several variables that allow me to identify the type of the main crime for which the
individual was convicted (in a particular conviction). The type of crime variables are
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based on the Swedish law books, sections of the law, paragraphs etc. through which I
deﬁne seven crime categories: violent crimes, property crimes, fraud and tax oﬀences,
drug crimes, traﬃc violations that exclude speeding or parking tickets, sex crimes,
and a category others that includes all other crimes that cannot be categorized into
one of the six. This categorisation, especially for the others category remains constant
over time.1 My data contain all crimes that individuals are subsequently convicted
for and the type of crime categorization is only limited by being able to uniquely
identifying a type of crime within the law book (for example assault of a husband
towards his wife can not be distinguished between assault towards a stranger, both
oﬀenders will be convicted based on the same laws concerning assault). Since the
reform is on county level, I aggregate the conviction data by county and month for
all men, and compute crime rates for each county-month and age per capita of the
population of that county-month-age group. From this data, I construct a crime panel
for each county, month and age that I split up by types of crimes, for January 1998-
December 2009. With this time window the data covers three years pre-policy and
eight to nine years after the reform. This crime panel is matched to additional county
characteristics. The empirical analysis of the opening hour expansion experiment is
based on a diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences approach exploiting the staggered implementation
of the policy across Swedish counties and time. This chapter expands the existing
analysis on Sweden's liberalization of opening hours of Grönqvist and Niknami (2011)
that was restricted to individuals between the ages of 17-23 and based on a diﬀerent
identiﬁcation strategy. The emphasis of the study presented in this chapter is to map
out the policy impact by age and type of crimes.
I present evidence on three sets of results. First, the eﬀect of the above mentioned
alcohol policy on alcohol sales in each county and month. This is based on monthly
alcohol sales data from the alcohol monopoly for the years 1997-2010. My results are
in line with the previous Swedish studies that ﬁnd a signiﬁcant and positive impact of
expanding the opening hours on weekends on alcohol sales (Norström and Skog (2003),
Norström and Skog (2005), and Grönqvist and Niknami (2011)). The magnitude of
the increase in alcohol sales estimated in this study ranges between 6.6-10 percent
increase in pure alcohol sold per capita. This translates into an increase of 0.2-0.3
litres of 13% wine per capita per month, or an increase of 0.5-0.7 litres of 5% beer per
capita per month. Those eﬀects are robust across various speciﬁcations, and persist
1See the Data description on a more detailed discussion of the type of crime categorization.
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over several years.
The main contribution of this paper is presented in the second and third set of
results. Those are results of the reform on age-crime proﬁles for overall crime and for
the seven crime categories deﬁned. My descriptive evidence and estimation results
presented in this paper show an interesting crime-age pattern induced by the policy:
increasing the availability of alcohol reduces overall crime rates for teenagers between
16-17 and adults between the ages 30-40, while it increases crime for young adults
between 20-28 and later in life between 45-55. This age pattern, in particular for the
two younger age groups, appears to be robust to various speciﬁcations.
The third set of results in this paper are eﬀects of the alcohol policy by types of
crimes and age. Since, I have the universe of all convictions in Sweden in my data I
can map out the impact on a very broad range of types of crimes and all ages. The
largest eﬀect of the policy appears to be on drug related crimes. Descriptive evidence
from other studies and countries indicates that when alcohol is involved in an oﬀence,
other drugs are often involved too. For example, the Bureau of Justice Statistics
(2004) states "In 7% of alcohol-involved violent incidents known to law enforcement,
other types of drugs were also suspected to be involved". The evidence presented
in this paper points towards alcohol and drugs being complements for young adults
through ages 20 to 30, supported by a large increase in drug related oﬀences for that
age group. The strong increase in overall crime observed for this age group, appears
to be mainly driven by drug related oﬀences, while somewhat oﬀset by a reduction in
property crimes. In contrast, alcohol and drugs appear to be substitutes for teenagers
16-17, which derives from a reduction in drug related oﬀences after the reform. In
addition, for teenagers property crimes decreased signiﬁcantly and weaker eﬀects for
traﬃc crimes, fraud and other crimes contribute to the overall reduction in crime
for teenagers as well. The negative eﬀect on middle aged men stems mainly from a
reduction in the crime category others and traﬃc oﬀences. The weakest eﬀect, the
increase in crime for men between the ages 45-55 can be mainly attributed towards
increased traﬃc crimes.
Finally, for violent crimes and sex crimes my results are mixed and one cannot
draw ﬁrm conclusions. Some ages experience a weak increase in violent crimes and
sex crimes following the increased availability of alcohol, mostly for the younger ones,
but the pattern is not very strong. Overall, these ﬁndings support the notion that
liberalization of alcohol policies can both increase and reduce crime, depending on
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the age of the oﬀenders and the types of crimes considered.
This study aims at better understanding the link between alcohol availability,
age and diﬀerent crime types. It expands the existing literature with a thorough
analysis of how alcohol policy can reduce/increase crime by types of crimes and most
importantly for all age-ranges. Most of the previous studies have focused on one or
two types of crimes onto which the eﬀect of alcohol is being evaluated, while this study
can contribute towards a more general discussion of a very broad range of types of
crimes for the entire age distribution. It can map out an age-proﬁle for a broader set
of crime categories. It contributes towards the more general discussion of how alcohol
policy can be used as policy tool to inﬂuence crime, and more speciﬁcally towards the
existing literature using temporal restrictions as identifying strategy.
In contrast to Biderman, De Mello, and Schneider (2010) that looks at restrictions
in social settings like bars this study estimates the impact of a temporal liberalization
of alcohol monopoly store opening hours. In Sweden alcohol can only be purchased
in those stores or in restaurant and bars. However, for example in 2009 only 12
percent of total alcohol consumed was bought in restaurants or bars and the remaining
alcohol consumed was purchased in the monopoly stores (in addition there is some
consumption based on exported goods from EU countries but estimates are hard to
get by).
In comparison to the age-restriction literature, the liberalization considered re-
moves a temporal restriction on all individuals. Age-laws completely restrict access
to alcohol for certain age groups, while in my case individuals could previously pur-
chase alcohol, it is just being made easier to do so on the weekends.
Drug crimes appear to be of great importance when considering alcohol related
policy interventions, contributing towards the discussion of the interaction between
these two. There does not seem to be a consensus in the existing literature on whether
alcohol and drugs should be seen as complements or substitutes. My heterogeneous
results by age and type of crime support the idea that the answer crucially depends
on the type of policy intervention considered, the target group, and the age of this
group.
This chapter is organised as follows. The next section reviews the relevant lit-
erature. Section 3.3 describes the institutional background of the Swedish alcohol
monopoly and the policy. Section 3.4 describes the data used, provides descriptive
evidence on alcohol and crime as well as lays out the empirical strategy employed. In
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section 3.5, I present the main results for total crime by age and disaggregated results
by types of crimes and age. The end of this section also presents various robustness
tests. Finally, Section 3.6 discusses the results and concludes.
3.2 Literature Review
A major diﬃculty in the literature on alcohol consumption and crime lies in estab-
lishing causality. Pharmacological and psychology studies show that alcohol reduces
inhibition and attention, impairs control, judgements, and reﬂexes, and also induces
aggressive behaviour (see McClelland, Davis, Kalin, and Wanner (1973)). Extreme
emotions and aggression in particular might play a role in violent crimes. However,
while alcohol has been documented to increase aggression levels in controlled labora-
tory experiments there still remain doubts about causality (Lipsey, Wilson, Cohen,
and Derzon (1997)).
Omitted variables bias is a major concern in the alcohol policy and crime lit-
erature, both through omitted unobserved regional factors and unobserved individ-
ual heterogeneity. Unobserved neighborhood characteristics such as regional alcohol
tax rates, regional alcohol outlet density, attitudes towards alcohol policy, attitudes
towards crime punishment, unobserved policies, and more generally neighbourhood
quality, might be correlated with alcohol policies and crime outcomes and thereby
confounding the estimates. Similarly, alcohol consumption and determinants of crime
might be correlated due to omitted unobserved individual characteristics such as risk
preferences, mental health problems etc.
Another econometric concern is non random selection in both arrest and victim-
ization data. If oﬀenders are more likely to be arrested or victims are more likely to
be victimized when under the inﬂuence of alcohol the eﬀect of alcohol policy on crime
could be overestimated. Related to this issue, is to disentangle whether alcohol policy
aﬀects crime committing, crime victimization or both.
A concern mostly relevant for the interpretation of the results of alcohol policy
on crime is whether alcohol policies change alcohol consumption per-se that leads
individuals to commit more or less crime or whether those policies shift the social
interaction structure. The estimates of alcohol policy on crime must be interpreted
as a combination of changing the amount of alcohol consumed and the changes in the
social interaction of intoxicated individuals, this applies to studies using MLDA, bar
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opening hours, outlet density and opening hours.
Finally, how alcohol policies shifts alcohol consumption for diﬀerent population
groups, the extent (intensity) or conditions of this consumption (locally for example)
remains unknown. Especially, when crime outcomes are concerned, the intensity
at which individuals consume alcohol and how this intensity changes in response to
alcohol policy is an important margin. More generally, whether such policies only have
a temporal impact on consumption and crime, or whether it is of a more permanent
nature is also not well established. One would also expect interactions of such alcohol
policies and police enforcement.
In the economics literature, the documentation of causality between alcohol and
crime is weak in general with a few exceptions. Following the classiﬁcation by Carpen-
ter and Dobkin (2010) one can distinguish those studies by the type of alcohol policy
being used (1) variation or changes in excise tax on alcohol, (2) spatial restrictions
on alcohol outlet density and availability, (3) age-based restrictions, like minimum
legal drinking ages, (4) temporal restrictions on alcohol sales, and (5) combination of
those.2
The ﬁrst category on alcohol taxes, inevitably belongs to studies that aim to
estimate the price elasticity of alcohol demand. Economic theory predicts that tax
induced increases in the price of alcohol should decrease consumption. The parameter
measured in those studies could be interpreted as the impact of a direct change in
the price of alcohol on crime. There does not appear to be a consensus on this
question. The literature survey of Grossman, Sindelar, Mullahy, and Anderson (1993)
summarizes the ﬁndings to be an elastic long-run, but inelastic short run alcohol
demand (suggesting that this might be due to the addictive nature of alcohol, p.
215). Within this set of taxation studies, there are various studies that attempt to
use alcohol excise tax variations and its impacts on crime. Based on cross-sectional
variation they provide merely correlational evidence. For example, Markowitz (2005)
ﬁnds that increased beer taxes in England and Wales are correlated with a reduction
in assaults and none in rape using victim data. On emergency hospitalization data
in England and Wales, Matthews, Shepherd, and Sivarajasingham (2006) ﬁnds that
the real price of beer is negatively correlated with violent injuries. Due to the cross-
sectional data and the type of crime data used in these studies they cannot address
2For an extensive summary of the existing literature based on this classiﬁcation by type of alcohol
policy used see Carpenter and Dobkin (2010).
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the omitted variable or the non-random selection issues mentioned above.
Studies that use the spatial diﬀerences in bar and outlet density measure a diﬀerent
parameter. Bar density is related to social alcohol consumption, which in itself might
contribute to more violent incidents (even without the alcohol). At the same time the
density of bars and/or outlets relates to how easily alcohol is available in a region.
This means the interpretation of the parameter could be how a reduction in the ﬁxed
costs to obtain alcohol (distance to outlet or bar) aﬀects the total price of alcohol,
thereby aﬀecting consumption and crime. Assaultive violence and bar/outlet density
was shown for example by Scribner, MacKinnon, and Dwyer (1995) to be positively
correlated. Those types of studies have attempted to address the omitted unobserved
regional characteristics mostly by including regional control variables, others have
attempted to address the econometric issues with instruments for alcohol outlets, or
event type studies (see Teh (2007)).
Studies on age-based restrictions (3) use more solid identiﬁcation strategies to ﬁnd
a causal impact of alcohol on crime and emphasise the sensitivity of young adults to
respond to alcohol policies. The parameter estimated in those studies is the eﬀect
of completely removing a full restriction on alcohol consumption for young adults
at a certain age. This can be seen as aﬀecting the total price of alcohol through
changing the costs of obtaining it. Convincing evidence from a regression discontinuity
design that exploits the age-discontinuity of MLDA in the US come from Carpenter
and Dobkin (2009). They show mortality rates, motor vehicle deaths or alcohol
related deaths increase around the age cut-oﬀ at 21. The variation in MLDA laws
across US states has been linked to alcohol consumption increases by 57 percent
more days and increased arrest rates for those just above the age of 21 (Carpenter
and Dobkin (2010)). Finally, zero-tolerance underage drunk-driving laws directly
aim at the issues of drinking and traﬃc and has been shown to change the age-
structure of DUI arrests, a decrease in property crimes and no eﬀect on violent crimes
for young adults (Carpenter (2005) and Carpenter (2007)). These types of studies
address the omitted variables issues by exploiting a regression discontinuity design
around the age cut-oﬀ. The issues to not being able to disentangle social interaction
and increased consumption, and that intoxicated oﬀenders or victims might be more
likely to be arrested or victimized remain. There is no reason to believe that increasing
alcohol availability at the age of 21 has the same eﬀect on consumption and crime
if the proportional increase happened at other ages. This external validity problem
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regarding the age of the individuals considered could be seen as one disadvantage,
though, since crime peaks around the age of 18-21 these studies measure the impact
of alcohol policy on crime at a point in the life-cycle when crime is most prevalent.
Targeted sales restrictions that temporarily restrict sales in bars or stores (4)
impose restrictions on the population as a whole but only in a speciﬁc setting. Sales
restrictions in bars or restaurants, often called dry laws, restrict social or recreational
consumption. The parameter measured in such studies is how changes in the price to
obtain alcohol (change in the ﬁxed costs) aﬀects crime. These types of studies are able
to address the omitted variable problem by including region ﬁxed eﬀects, and thereby
accounting for time-invariant omitted variables that are likely to be correlated with
the alcohol policy and crime in that region. Using diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence strategies,
these studies can implement a convincing pre-post policy design. Convincing evidence
on the eﬀectiveness of changes in the mandatory closing hours of bars and restaurants
on crime reduction in Brazil is provided in Biderman, De Mello, and Schneider (2010).
The authors document a large reduction of about 10 percent in homicides induced
by the mandatory night closing hours for bars between March 2001 and August 2004
in São Paulo Metropolitan Area, with similar results for battery and accident related
deaths. The authors also ﬁnd a reduction in bar consumption of alcohol (by large
magnitude of 50-70 percent).
Sales restrictions on stores in contrast impose a restriction on times at which in-
dividuals can buy alcohol for consumption at home. For example, restricted opening
hours on Sundays in Canada shows a reduction in alcohol sales on the day of the re-
striction (Carpenter and Eisenberg (2009)). From Sweden, earlier studies of Norström
and Skog (2003) and Norström and Skog (2005) document a signiﬁcant increase in
alcohol sales following the Saturday opening hour expansion of the alcohol stores, but
no eﬀect on crime (measured by reported assaults) or on aggregated health indicators.
More recently, Grönqvist and Niknami (2011) use individual conviction register data
and the same opening hours expansion. They compare conviction rates in counties
where the stores remained closed between individuals below and above the national
drinking age of 20 that is the age group 17-18 (excluding 19 year olds) compared to
20-23 to the diﬀerence in counties where stores were opened on Saturdays. One con-
cern with this approach is to use teenagers below the age of 20 as control groups. In
Sweden individuals are allowed to purchase alcohol in the alcohol stores from the age
of 20 onwards, while alcohol purchase and consumption on-premises in bars, night-
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clubs and restaurants is allowed from the age of 18. By assigning teenagers below 20
as being not treated by the policy, the authors ignore spill-over eﬀects of older siblings
or friends who can buy alcohol for them. They ﬁnd an increase in property crime of
11.6 percent, none on total or violent crimes for men aged 20-23 living in counties
where the expansion was ﬁrst introduced.3
The last set of studies reviewed here, relates to several of the above categories,
but distinguishes itself by the types of crimes considered. These studies are concerned
with the complementarity/substitutability of alcohol and drugs. The evidence in this
literature is mixed, on the one hand, there is support for alcohol and marijuana (and
other harder drugs) to be complements.
For example, Yörük and Yörük (2011) and Yörük and Yörük (2013) ﬁnd a nega-
tive spill over eﬀect from alcohol towards marijuana consumption using a regression
discontinuity design around the MLDA age cut-oﬀ with data from the NLSY97. Their
ﬁndings translate into an increase in marijuana use of about 5.5-7 percentage points
around the 21 years age cut-oﬀ.4 In contrast, Crost and Guerrero (2012) ﬁnds support
for the opposite. Using the 2002-2007 National Survey of Drug Use and Health (NS-
DUH) in the US they ﬁnd that alcohol consumption at the MLDA cut-oﬀ increases
by 16 percent and reduces marijuana consumption by 10 percent supporting the view
that alcohol and marijuana are substitutes.5
Anderson and Hansen (forthcoming) is relevant for my ﬁndings on traﬃc viola-
tions and drugs combined. Based on the implementation of medical marijuana laws
(MML) in the US their ﬁndings provide evidence for MMLs to reduce traﬃc fatalities
in total (by 9 percent), strongest among young adults, and even more so for traﬃc
accidents involving alcohol (by 12 percent for any alcohol involvement and 14 percent
reduction for high alcohol level involvement). They also speak towards age-speciﬁc
eﬀects, ﬁnding little impact of MMLs on minors and an especially strong reduction
in alcohol consumption for ages 20 through 29 years. They argue that an increase
in marijuana consumption reduces alcohol consumption which reduces traﬃc fatal-
3Additional ﬁndings of their study: On Saturdays total crime of 20-23 year olds increased by 18.7
percent in the early treated counties, and the eﬀect is stronger with an 21 percent increase for those
men with low compulsory schooling grades.
4As part of their study Yörük and Yörük (2011) also ﬁnds that MLDA increases the probability
of alcohol consumption for those after the age-cut-oﬀ (13 percentage points), increase in number
of days in a month spent drinking (1.7 more days), increase of probability of binge drinking (10
percentage points), but they ﬁnd no increase in the number of drinks consumed in a day.
5Further evidence on the substitutability between alcohol and marijuana comes from Chaloupka
and Laixuthai (1997), DiNardo and Lemieux (2001). More evidence on the complementarity: Far-
relly, Bray, Zarkin, Wendling, and Pacula (1999), Williams, Pacula, Chaloupka, and Wechsler (2004).
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ities (under alcohol inﬂuence), supporting the idea that marijuana and alcohol are
substitutes.
The majority of the existing studies measure how changes in the cost of obtaining
alcohol inﬂuences crime. Lifting of age-restrictions reduces the costs of illegally ob-
taining alcohol (psychic costs of breaking the law, legal consequences warnings etc.)
can be seen as a diﬀerent cost from costs incurred by changing regional bar/outlet
store availability from having fewer stores in their neighbourhood (longer distances
to drive), and changing opening hours that restrict individuals to purchase alcohol
within set opening hours. Common in all those policies is the change in the costs of
obtaining alcohol, that indirectly contributes towards the price of alcohol. The only
work that directly changes the monetary price of alcohol are the tax studies. At the
same time the social interaction component has to be considered when interpreting
the results.
3.3 Institutional Details of the Policy
3.3.1 Background of the Swedish Alcohol Monopoly
To understand the policy that this study focuses on, one has to go back to explain how
alcohol sales have been historically organised in Sweden. Alcohol sales in Sweden are
strictly regulated by the government and since 1954 a state alcohol monopoly system
is in eﬀect. Any alcoholic beverages with alcohol content above 3.5% by volume are
only sold in state monopoly alcohol retail stores called Systembolaget. While it is
legal to consume alcohol on-premises in bars and restaurants from the age of 18,
the minimum legal age to purchase alcohol in oﬀ-premises stores is 20 which is very
strictly enforced with the requirement to show ID cards.6 Regular grocery stores are
only allowed to sell light beers with an alcohol content of less than 3.5% by volume.
Alcohol excise taxes in Sweden are higher than in any other EU country. In the
relevant period 1998-2009 ethyl alcohol was taxed at 501.41 SEK (GBP 37.5) per litre,
wines with 8.5-15 percentage of alcohol at 27.20-21.58 SEK (GBP 2.03-1.61) per litre,
beers exceeding 3.5 percentage of alcohol were taxed at 1.47-1.66 SEK (GBP 0.11-
0.12) per litre.7 Excise taxes on wines below 15 percentage of alcohol were reduced
6Anybody who looks younger than 25 will be asked to show their ID card when purchasing alcohol.
This also applies to anybody in the company of the purchasing person in the store.
7Computed at the average exchange rate for the years 1998-2009: 1 SEK=GBP 0.0747 (1
SEK=EUR 0.1082 and 1 SEK=USD 0.1266).
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by 18.8 percent in 2002, with a second reduction of 2.2 percent in 2008. For all
other alcohol types (spirits, stronger wine, and beer8) excise taxes remained constant.
The 25 percent VAT tax rate on all alcohol remained constant since 1991. Potential
impacts of the wine excise tax rate changes are discussed in Section 3.4.3.
The opening hours of the alcohol stores Systembolaget are also decided and reg-
ulated by the Swedish government.9 In 1981 the government decided to conduct an
experiment between June and September 1981, in which all alcohol stores were to close
on Saturdays. The experiment was evaluated based on the eﬀects on alcohol sales,
drunkenness, domestic and public disturbances (Olsson and Wikström (1982)). They
ﬁnd that the 1981 experiment decreased total alcohol sales and the considered aggre-
gated crime outcomes relative to the same period in the previous year. The reduction
was more pronounced on Saturdays. Partly based on the results of the experiment,
the Swedish government decided in Spring 1982 to permanently close alcohol stores
on Saturdays starting from 1 July 1982. Stores remained closed on weekends until
the re-opening on Saturdays after another policy experiment starting in 2000. Data
limitations in my crime data prevent me from being able to explore this ﬁrst opening
hours reform in 1982. It is the second experiment that started in 2000 which this
study focuses on.
3.3.2 The 2000-2001 Weekend Opening Hours Liberalization
The Swedish parliament decided to open alcohol retail stores on Saturdays in 6 out
of 21 counties as part of an experiment in February 2000. The aim of the experiment
was to evaluate and assess the eﬀect of the liberalized opening hours before expand-
ing it to the rest of the country. The experimental counties Jämtland, Norrbotten,
Skåne, Stockholm, Västerbotten and Västernorrland comprise 3.8m individuals which
corresponds to about half of the entire Swedish population. Those counties include
South Sweden (including Sweden's third largest city Malmö), the Stockholm region
(Sweden's largest metropolitan area), as well as three counties in the North (the least
densely populated area). The 2000 policy experiment was initially evaluated in the
oﬃcial report by Norström and Skog (2003), who deﬁned the treatment regions to be
non-neighbouring counties of the experimental counties. They reported (i) an increase
8The excise taxes on beer increased in 2008 by 12,9 percent.
9There have historically been some exceptions with short alcohol sales experiments, for example
the strong beer sales experiment in parts of Sweden between November 1967 and July 1968 (see
Nilsson (2012) and Nilsson (2008)).
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in alcohol sales, (ii) no increase in the number of assaults reported to the police, (iii)
no change in various health indicators for the experimental regions compared with
the treatment regions after February 2000. Based on this oﬃcial report, the Swedish
parliament voted in spring 2001 for the country wide introduction of the liberalized
opening hours to be implemented in the remaining 15 counties in July 2001. Since
July 2001 alcohol stores are open on Saturdays across the whole country. The second
stage of the experiment was evaluated by Norström and Skog (2005), who expanded
on their initial evaluation to ﬁnd that alcohol sales increased by equally much in the
second stage of the experiment, with no eﬀects on assaults after introduction nei-
ther for early nor late introducing counties, but an eﬀect on drunk-driving in early
introducing counties and none in late introducers.
3.4 Data, Empirical Method and Descriptives
3.4.1 Data Sources
Crime Register Data
I exploit detailed individual conviction register data from Sweden, provided by The
Swedish National Council for Crime Prevention (Brå) that contain all convictions
in Sweden between 1973 and 2010. Every single conviction listed identiﬁes the in-
dividual who was convicted with a unique personal identiﬁer number. In addition
every single conviction observation lists: the total number of crimes the individual is
being convicted for in that particular conviction, the main oﬀence of that conviction
deﬁned as the most severe violation within the conviction, the type of crime of the
main crime, the date of the conviction, the date when the crime was committed, the
age at oﬀence, and a court identiﬁer number.
The main crime within each conviction speciﬁes the main crime rate and the num-
ber of crimes stated in each conviction is used to compute total crime rates. Types
of crimes are detailed in several variables that specify the law book, section, chapter,
paragraph, moment, piece and point in the Swedish law that the crime was convicted
for.10 Variables specifying the types of crimes are available only for the main crime.
I deﬁne seven types of crime categories: violent crimes (violent), property crimes and
10Details of the types of crimes variables in the conviction data in Brå Variabelbeskrivning
Lagföringsregistret (2009) and the documentation of coding crime types in Brå Kodning av Brott
(2010)
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theft (property), fraud and tax evasion (fraud), drugs oﬀences (drugs), sex crimes
(sex ), traﬃc crimes excluding speeding and parking tickets (traﬃc), and other crimes
that can include anything else that does not belong into the latter six categories (oth-
ers). The categorisation of crime types and the coding is based on the documentation
provided by Brå Kodning av Brott (2010) as well as the Swedish law books which
the variables in the data refer to (i.e. law-book and chapter). The limitations of
the crime type variables are for example that I cannot distinguish diﬀerent types of
assaults. Domestic violence that lead to an assault of the spouse and an assault on
the street where the oﬀender and the victim are strangers, will both appear in the
data as assault, because both oﬀences will be convicted based on the same law.11 The
category summarizing all other crimes that do not ﬁt into one of the six speciﬁc types
does not grow or shrink over time. It does not include certain crimes in one year
that it did not in previous years (and vice versa). Where changes in the Swedish law
took place the coding of the type of crime was adjusted for each single change over
the relevant period. Figure 3.8 in the Appendix plots the total number of crimes for
each crime category by year. One can observe some variation over time, but overall
all crimes except traﬃc, appear stable across time.
The court identiﬁer numbers are matched to municipality or county names that
the court serves through which I identify the region where the crime was committed.12
In general courts deal with crimes that were committed in that region. Court codes
are available and can be matched to regional codes for all convictions from 1995
onwards.13 Exact dates of when the crimes were committed are only provided in
about 60-65 percent of convictions in the years 1973-1997, convictions in the year
1998 miss a date of crime only in 10.8 percent. For convictions from 1999 onwards
the date of the crime committed are available in all cases. Typically convictions take
place 1-2 years after the oﬀence. The time range used for the empirical analysis
is determined by these data restrictions and I use all crimes that were committed
between 1998 and 2009 and that have subsequently led to a court conviction. This is
also the reason for not being able to analyze the reversed policy in 1982 which closed
the stores on Saturdays.
The individual conviction data was aggregated to the county-month-age-gender
11In this case Swedish Penal Code, Chapter 3 Section 5.
12Speciﬁcation of regional matches to court codes Domstolskod and Åklagarkod were provided by
brå.
13Note year 1995 refers to conviction year.
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level to construct a panel data set of crime for men by age for all Swedish counties and
for each month between January 1998-December 2009.14 Crime rates are computed for
each county and month based on yearly population size data extrapolated to month
level. Population numbers for each county-year-age-gender observation are taken from
Statistics Sweden Population data. Rates are computed for the main crimes, crime
types for the main crimes and for the total number of crimes.
County Characteristics and Alcohol Sales Data
To control for confounding factors that are relevant for criminal behaviour I use aggre-
gated data from the publicly available data of Statistics Sweden on employment levels
and education. As labour market indicators I use the share of individuals employed
in each county and age for each month as well as education levels for each county, age
and year.15 These were matched on to the crime data.
Finally, to evaluate the impact of the alcohol experiment on alcohol sales and con-
sumption I use data from several sources. Monthly alcohol sales data by litres of pure
alcohol, total litres and amount in Swedish Krona by county for each month between
January 1997 and December 2011, were directly provided by the alcohol monopoly
store Systembolaget. In my analysis I focus on the monthly alcohol sales data by total
litres of pure alcohol, from which I compute the litres of pure alcohol bought per
capita in a month. From this measure one can compute how many litres this would
correspond to in beer or wine of a certain percentage of alcohol. Monthly alcohol sales
data by types of alcohol (beer, wine, spirit and others) from Systembolaget is only
available for the entire country (not by county) during the relevant period. On county
level the data is on yearly level. For descriptive purposes, I use yearly sales data by
types of alcohol publicly available at the Swedish National Institute for Public Health
(Statens Folkhälsoinstitut).
Statistics Sweden administers a Living Conditions survey, in which alcohol con-
sumption was included in the questionnaires for the years 1995-96 and 2004. I use the
published descriptive evidence on changes in the alcohol consumption intensity over
time by age groups from the Living Standard Report from Statistics Sweden. Unfortu-
nately, the Living Conditions Survey for Children was ﬁrst conducted in 2001, which
means I cannot infer about alcohol consumption changes of children and teenagers for
14Documentation of variables and description in Brå Variabelbeskrivning Lagföringsregistret
(2009)




The ﬁrst part of this chapter will establish the impact of the reform on alcohol sales.
The estimated diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences speciﬁcation to analyze changes in alcohol sales
following the expansion of Saturday opening hours of alcohol stores has the form,
log(Acmy) = α1 + β1Tcmy + γc + γm + θ1t+ wcmy.(3.1)
This equation is estimated based on a monthly panel of alcohol sales for each
county c and month for the years 1997-2009 indicated by my. Alcohol sales are
measured as the logarithm of alcohol sold in litres of 100 percent alcohol per capita
of adult population above age 20 in each county and each month, log(Acmy). Tcmy is
an indicator variable that equals 1 if the policy was implemented in the county c in
month m and year y. To control for county speciﬁc time invariant characteristics all
estimations include county ﬁxed eﬀects (γc). Alcohol sales vary by season and month
m, hence month ﬁxed eﬀects (γm) and linear time trends (t) are included. All alcohol
estimations presented in this study are based on Prais-Winsten regressions, for which
I deﬁne time t as the number of months since January 1997. Using this time variable I
deﬁne a county-speciﬁc time trend (tc) that is used in the robustness exercises instead
of the linear trend (t). Furthermore, the underlying assumption is a county-speciﬁc
AR(1) error structure, wcmy = wct = ρcuct−1 + ect, where ect is a classical error term,
and wcmy is county-speciﬁc heteroskedastic and contemporaneously correlated across
counties.
To analyze the eﬀects of the policy change in alcohol store opening hours on crime
by age I estimate the following panel data speciﬁcation for county c in month m and
16There exists a number of alcohol consumption surveys in Sweden, but unfortunately they either
start too late or access is not possible. For example the Monitor Project administered between 2001-
2012 by the Center for Social Research on Alcohol and Drugs at Stockholm University (SoRAD) and
since 2012 at the Swedish Council for Information on Alcohol and Other Drugs (CAN). The start of
the study is too late to be used for this study, and access is not possible for external researchers.
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year y for age a,
yjcmya =α + βaD(a) ∗ Tcmy + ηaD(a) + γc + γm+(3.2)
δ1Xcmya + δ2Xcmyg + θctc + vcmya,
where yjcmya is the number of crimes of the category j committed in county-month-
year and age a, per 100,000 of the male population. D(a) is an indicator variable for
age a = {16, ..., 64} and Tcmy is an indicator variable that equals 1 if the policy was
implemented in the county c in month m and year y. The age speciﬁc parameter βa is
the parameter of interest that captures the diﬀerential changes in crime rates by age
before and after the policy. The ﬁxed eﬀects γc and γm capture permanent diﬀerences
across counties and monthly variation in crime, respectively. In Xcmya and Xcmyg I
control for county-speciﬁc time varying and age or age-group speciﬁc variables: the
share of individuals in the population holding a certain education level in age a in
year y and the share of gainfully employed men in the population for men in the
age-groups 16-19, 20-24, 25-29, etc. Just like the alcohol estimations, I estimate all
crime estimations using a Prais-Winsten regression, for which I deﬁne time t as the
number of months since January 1998. The underlying assumptions on the county-
speciﬁc AR(1) error structure, vcmya are the same as above. Estimations are done for
the full sample, which means I include all age groups in the estimation. The results
section will present three sets of results for diﬀerent dependent crime variables: (1)
main crime rate, (2) separated by seven types of crimes referring to the main crime,
and ﬁnally, (3) total crime rate.
3.4.3 Descriptive Evidence
The Policy Impact on Alcohol Sales
The ﬁrst important fact to establish for this study is whether the alcohol policy had an
impact on alcohol sales, which I will then argue has an impact on criminal behaviour.
Table 3.1 shows average monthly alcohol sales per capita in litres of pure alcohol
before and after the policy was introduced (and split up for early and late treated
counties). The Table also reports the unconditional diﬀerences in average alcohol
sales before and after. The standard errors of a test of equal means shows that the
unconditional means are signiﬁcantly diﬀerent. To put the numbers into perspective
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relative to litres of wine or beer sold, I transformed the litres of pure alcohol per
capita into how many litres of wine with 13 percent alcohol or litres of beer with 5
percent alcohol this would correspond to. Before the reform Systembolaget sold 0.345
litres of pure alcohol per capita per month, this corresponds to 2.7 litres of wine, or 7
litres of beer per capita and month. After the reform this increased to an average of
0.464 litres of pure alcohol, corresponding to 3.6 litres of wine or 9.3 litres of beer per
capita per month. The levels are very similar across early and late treated counties.
These numbers are averages that also include the more general trend of increases in
alcohol consumption over the years. In the empirical analysis all estimations include
time trends. Figure 3.1 shows yearly alcohol sales by types of alcohol over the years
for entire Sweden. One can observe an increasing trend in both beer and wine sales
per capita, while spirits and others (cider or mixed drinks like alcopops) remained
constant throughout.
Table 3.1: Average Alcohol Sales Before and After the Policy
Years 1998-2008
All Counties
After Before Diﬀerence SE
Average Litres of 100% Alcohol Per Capita Sold 0.464 0.354 0.110*** (0.005)
Equivalent to Litres of 13% Wine Per Capita Sold 3.567 2.725
Equivalent to Litres of 5% Beer Per Capita Sold 9.275 7.086
Observations 1,992 1,032
Early Counties
Average Litres of 100% Alcohol Per Capita Sold 0.498 0.374 0.124*** (0.011)
Equivalent to Litres of 13% Wine Per Capita Sold 3.830 2.875
Equivalent to Litres of 5% Beer Per Capita Sold 9.957 7.476
Observations 642 222
Late Counties
Average Litres of 100% Alcohol Per Capita Sold 0.448 0.349 0.099*** (0.006)
Equivalent to Litres of 13% Wine Per Capita Sold 3.443 2.684
Equivalent to Litres of 5% Beer Per Capita Sold 8.951 6.979
Observations 1,350 810
Notes: Average monthly alcohol sales of alcohol monopoly store Systembolaget before and after the liberalization
of Saturday opening hours. Average monthly alcohol sales are stated in litres of 100% pure alcohol per capita of
adult population above the age of 20. The diﬀerence of the unconditional averages are reported, including the
standard error of a test of equality of the means. For comparison purposes, those litres of pure alcohol are scaled
towards the equivalent in litres of wine with an alcohol content of 13%, and for the equivalent in litres of beer
with an alcohol content of 5%. Averages are presented for all counties, and separately for early and late treated
counties.
Table 3.2 presents the results from estimating Equation 3.1. There is a large statis-
tically signiﬁcant increase in alcohol sales following the liberalization of opening hours
in the range of 6.6-10.3 percent depending on the speciﬁcation used. This increase
corresponds to 0.023-0.036 litres of pure alcohol per capita and month. Scaling this
number of pure alcohol towards 13 percent wine or 5 percent beer, this would corre-
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spond to an increase of 0.18-0.28 litres of wine or 0.47-0.73 litres of beer per capita
per month. The baseline speciﬁcation covers all counties and the time period between
January 1997 to December 2008, which includes the ﬁrst and the second stage of the
policy experiment. Column (2) to (7) in Table 3.2 perform various robustness checks
of the baseline results. Column (2) includes county speciﬁc linear time trends not
altering the eﬀect.
In 2004 EU laws required Sweden to abolish its import restrictions on alcohol
from other EU countries. Column (3) only includes data up until 2003. All other EU
countries, and in particular neighbouring countries such as Germany, Denmark, and
Finland, have lower excise taxes on alcohol. One would expect a decrease in alcohol
sales within Sweden due to the trade liberalization (increased opportunity to bring
or buy alcohol from traveling to other EU countries) and hence exclusion of post
2003 alcohol sales should increase the estimated coeﬃcient. However, the reverse is
true and the estimate decreases by excluding years 2004 and beyond. As Figure 3.1
suggests the drop in alcohol sales in 2004 was merely restricted to beer sales, not wine
or spirits, and was only restricted to 2004 and somewhat 2005 and seems to not have





























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Speciﬁcations (4)-(7) all include county speciﬁc time trends and restrict the sam-
ple period to end before the second stage of the policy started, January 1997 to
June 2001. The overall eﬀect from the ﬁrst stage of the policy increases alcohol sales
by 7.4 percent (0.026 litres of pure alcohol per capita and month) in those counties
that implemented early. Border shopping within Sweden from late to early treated
counties or from Skåne (South Sweden) into Denmark could also have an impact on
the results. Excluding bordering counties to the early treatment counties increases
the coeﬃcient somewhat to 7.9 percent. Excluding Skåne (Southern most county in
Sweden bordering Copenhagen, Denmark) slightly increases the coeﬃcient to 7.7 per-
cent. Relative to column (4) these estimates point toward robustness of the estimated
results. Border shopping does not appear to be important.
Figure 3.1: Alcohol Sales in Litres Sold per Capita Aged Above 15 by Alcohol Type
Notes: Figure shows yearly number of litres sold by the alcohol monopoly store Systembolaget per
adult population above the age of 15 for beer, wine, spirits and others between 1998 and 2009.
The category others include cider and mixed alcoholic beverages such as alcopops. Source: Statens
Folkhälsoinstitut, Databas Alkohol Konsumption.
Comparing my results to the existing Swedish studies of Grönqvist and Niknami
(2011) and Norström and Skog (2005) I ﬁnd that the results of my preferred speciﬁca-
tion are larger. The diﬀerence to the other studies stems from the fact that they focus
on a more narrow time window only up until the second stage of the experiment was
implemented as well as restricting the control group to the sample of non-bordering
counties to the ﬁrst treated counties (see Table 3.2 columns (4)-(7)). When choosing
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the same sample as Grönqvist and Niknami (2011), my results are identical to theirs.
The dynamics of the changes are presented in Table 3.3 with all speciﬁcations
including county and month ﬁxed eﬀects and county speciﬁc linear time trends. Col-
umn (1) splits up the treatment variable into early and late treatment, indicating
increases in alcohol sales per capita for both types of counties by around 9 percent.
The variables 0-1 years, 1-2 years, 2-3 years, and 3-4 years indicate the time elapsed
since implementation. The ﬁrst year after implementation saw a 6.6 percent increase
in sales for both types of counties, a 8.6 percent increase during the second year after
implementation, 6.3 percent for the third, and only during the fourth year did the
eﬀect level oﬀ to a 1.6 percent increase that is not statistically signiﬁcant anymore.
Overall, there appears to be a strong and long-lasting increase in alcohol sales for
both types of counties.
Table 3.3: Dynamics of Alcohol Policy Eﬀects on Alcohol Sales
Dependent variable:
Log(Litres of 100% Alcohol Sold Per Capita in Month)
(1) (2)















Notes: Signiﬁcance levels *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The depen-
dent variable is the logarithm of litres of 100% alcohol sold per capita
in a county and month by the alcohol monopoly store Systembolaget.
Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered by county. The sam-
ple period runs from 01/1997-12/2008. In Speciﬁcation (1), the Early
indicator variable equals 1 from 02/2000 onwards for early treated
counties, and zero otherwise. The Late indicator variable equals 1
from 07/2001 for late treated counties, and zero otherwise. In Speci-
ﬁcation (2), the indicator variable 0-1 years equals 1 during the ﬁrst
year after treatment, and zero otherwise, the indicator variable 1-2
equals 1 from 1 to 2 years after treatment, etc. All speciﬁcations in-
clude county and month ﬁxed eﬀects and county speciﬁc linear time
trends. All estimations are based on Prais-Winsten regressions, for
which I deﬁne time t as the number of months since January 1997.
The underlying assumption is a county-speciﬁc AR(1) error stucture,
wcmy = wct = ρcuct−1 + ect, where ect is a classical error term, and
wcmy is county-speciﬁc heteroskedastic and contemporaneously corre-
lated across counties.
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As emphasized above, my analysis is focused on the heterogeneity of the reform
eﬀect on crime with respect to age. Optimally, I would like to estimate the eﬀect
of the liberalized opening hours on alcohol consumption by age, but data limitations
prevent me from doing so. I will use the descriptive statistics published in the Liv-
ing Conditions Report of Statistics Sweden to show some diﬀerences in changes in
alcohol consumption intensity across age groups. The Living Conditions Survey con-
ducted by Statistics Sweden contains questions on alcohol consumption for the years
1995-96 and 2004 that is administered for adults above 20. Table 3.4 presents the
percentages of men reporting one of four intensities of alcohol consumption and how
those changed between the two surveys. No consumption is deﬁned as reporting to
have consumed no alcohol within the past 12 months, low consumption for men is
deﬁned as less than approximately 2 bottles of wine per week, medium consumption
between approximately 2 and 2.5 bottles of wine per week, and high consumption
above approximately 2.5 litres of wine per week.
Table 3.4: Alcohol Consumption Intensity for Men by Age Reported in 2004 and
1995-96 Survey, in Percent of Surveyed Men
Percent Reporting Percent Reporting Percent Reporting Percent Reporting
No Consumption Low Consumption Medium Consumption High Consumption
2004 95-96 Diﬀ 2004 95-96 Diﬀ 2004 95-96 Diﬀ 2004 95-96 Diﬀ
Total 10 14 -4 55 60 -5 19 14 5 15 12 3
Ages
20-34 6.2 6.7 -0.5 52.4 60.5 -8.1 21.4 17.7 3.7 20.0 15.1 4.9
35-44 6.8 10.3 -3.5 55.4 59.7 -4.3 21.2 17.6 3.6 16.6 12.4 4.2
45-54 9.1 10 -0.9 55.0 62.4 -7.4 20.4 15.5 4.9 15.5 12.1 3.4
55-64 8.7 14.4 -5.7 56.7 62.4 -5.7 20.2 12.4 7.8 14.4 10.8 3.6
65-74 16.2 23.7 -7.5 60.9 60.7 0.2 14.7 7.4 7.3 8.2 8.2 0
75-84 29.1 34.9 -5.8 55.9 53.3 2.6 8.2 6.4 1.8 6.8 5.4 1.4
Notes: Percent of men reporting one of the four levels of alcohol consumption intensity in Living Con-
ditions Survey 1995-96 and 2004, and the change between the surveys. Deﬁnitions of alcohol intensity
for men: no consumption: no alcohol consumption at all in the last 12 months, Low consumption: at
most 12.6 cl 100 % alcohol per week, which is at most 2 bottles of wine per week, middle consump-
tion: between 12.6 cl and 21 cl of 100% alcohol, between 2 and 2.5 bottles of wine per week, high
consumption: 21 cl 100% alcohol, which is more than 2.5 bottles of wine per week. Source: Living
Conditions Report no 114, Use of alcohol and tobacco, Oﬃcial Statistics of Sweden, Statistics Sweden
2007 (Statistiska centralbyrån (2007)).
More general observations from these descriptives are that for all age groups the
proportion of men who report no consumption or low consumption decreased in 2004
relative to the 95-96 survey, while reporting medium and high consumption increased
for all age groups. The highest proportion of those reporting high alcohol consumption
are men aged 20-34, followed by men aged 35-44, and further decreasing with age in
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both surveys. In this high consumption groups the largest increase between 95-96
and 2004 is reported for men aged 20-34 at 4.9 percent, followed by 35-44 year olds
at 4.2 percent and at around 3 percent for older ages until 65. Medium consumption
appears to be more equally distributed across ages, with around 20 percent of men
between the ages 20-64 reporting medium consumption levels in 2004, though changes
between 95-96 and 2004 appear to be largest for older age groups between 55-74 year
olds at over 7 percent, 5 percent for men aged 45-54 and only around 3 percent for
the younger ages. A higher percentage of older ages reports no alcohol consumption
compared to the younger age groups, however, the largest reduction over time in the
no alcohol consumption category seem to happen for older men above 55 years.
Another relevant statistic is binge drinking reports. Unlike a certain average
weekly consumption which could be spread out over several days, binge drinking
is deﬁned as drinking more than one quarter of a bottle of spirit, or equivalently more
than 1 bottle of wine at one single point in time at least once every month. Figure
3.2 presents percentages of men who report binge drinking by age groups and for
both survey years. Similarly to medium and high intensity drinking, binge drinking
increased for all age groups between 95-96 and 2004. In 95-96 around 28 percent of
men aged 20-34 reported to binge drink and that increased to around 33 percent in
2004. While, the percentage of men reporting binge drinking declines by age, still
23 percent of men aged 35-44 report binge drinking in 2004 (up from 17 percent in
95-96). For the older age groups, 18 percent of men aged 45-54 report doing so, 15
percent of 55-64 year olds, 10 percent of 65-74 year olds, and less than 5 percent of
75-84 year olds. All of the older age groups saw an increase of about 2-3 percentage
points since 95-96.
While, I cannot examine alcohol consumption responses by age, the analysis for
total sales has shown an increase following the reform. The descriptives from the
Statistics Sweden report point towards high levels of high intensity and in particular
binge drinking activities of men aged 20-45, with largest increases since 95-96 for
the youngest, men aged 20-34. Thus, one might expect the largest eﬀect of alcohol
liberalisation on crime for this age group if high intensity alcohol consumption leads to
increased criminal activity. Unfortunately, there are no alcohol consumption surveys
available for children and teenagers younger than 20 before 2001.
The last remaining issue for the alcohol sales analysis is the decrease in excise
taxes for some types of wines in 2002 close to the experiment. First, aggregated
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Figure 3.2: Percent of Surveyed Men in 2004 and 1995-96 to Report Binge Drinking
by Age Groups
Notes: Binge drinking for men is deﬁned as reporting to drink at least one quarter of a bottle of
spirit, or equivalently one bottle of wine or 4 cans of strong beer (5 of medium-strong beer) at one
point in time at least once per month. Source: Living Conditions Report no 114, Use of alcohol and
tobacco, Oﬃcial Statistics of Sweden, Statistics Sweden (Statistiska centralbyrån (2007))
alcohol sales data by types of alcohol do not suggest a strong behavioural response
of consumers to the decreased excise taxes on some wines, with a steady increase in
wine sales already before 2002. Second, the analysis in Table 3.2, column (4) restricts
the analysis to pre-July 2001 and ﬁnds a large eﬀect of alcohol sales. This result
supports the notion that overall alcohol sales are unlikely to be driven by this excise
tax decrease on some types of wines. Third, I would like to emphasise that the excise
tax decrease only aﬀected certain types of wines. Regardless, if some age groups
respond diﬀerently to excise tax decreases in low alcohol content wine than other age
groups, the interpretation of the results might change.
Descriptive Evidence on Crime by Age
Figure 3.3 presents average crime rates by age separated by treatment status. Averages
for the main crime rate are shown in the ﬁrst Figure 3.3.1. The second Figure 3.3.2
shows the corresponding average crime rates for the total crime rate. To reiterate,
the main overall crime rate refers to the most severe crime within a single conviction,
while the total overall crime rate refers to the total number of crimes that individuals
are being convicted for. Most convictions contain more crimes than the main crime,
and the total crime rate accounts for those and is about twice as large as the main
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crime rate. Crime rates are computed as the number of crimes committed in each
county, month and age, scaled by 100,000 male individuals. These graphs emphasize
the crime age proﬁle that is standard in the crime literature, with a sharp increase
during teenage years, a peak at around 21, and decreasing thereafter. However, in
my data, I observe a leveling oﬀ around the age of 30 until crime starts falling again
in the mid forties.
Descriptive evidence on changes in overall crime for men before and after lib-
eralized opening hours by ages is presented in Figure 3.4. Figure 3.4.1 shows the
diﬀerences in average main crime rates after and before treatment for each age; Fig-
ure 3.4.2 presents the crime rate diﬀerences for total number of crimes. These Figures
point towards increases in main crime and total crime rates for men in their twenties
(20-28) and mid- to late-forties. For teenagers one can observe a reduction in crime
rates following the reform. The most pronounced impact on crime appears to be a
reduction in the middle ages between the ages of 30-45. Total crime rates are twice as
large as main crime rates and hence the pattern in Figure 3.4.2 is more pronounced.
To better understand what is driving these changes in the main crime rates I
disaggregate crime rates by seven crime categories (violent, property, fraud, drugs,
traﬃc, others, and sex crimes). Figure 3.5 shows the changes in main crime rates
before and after treatment for the corresponding types of crimes. For comparison
purposes, the ﬁrst Figure 3.5.1 repeats the overall changes in main crime and the
following sub-Figures split up the changes in main crime by type.
For younger ages, late teens up until early thirties (ages 17-33) drug oﬀences
increase substantially relative to before the alcohol policy was implemented, with the
largest relative increase for drug oﬀences depicted for men in their early twenties
(Figure 3.5.5). In addition, traﬃc crimes also increase for early ages 15-25 relative to
the pre-policy period (Figure 3.5.6). At the same time for young men between ages
15-22 there seems to be a large reduction in property crimes, and a smaller reduction
in the categories fraud and other crimes. The pattern for violent and sex crimes for
early ages is not conclusive. Overall, for young ages, the descriptive evidence shows
increases in drug and traﬃc crimes after the reform and this increase seems to be
partly oﬀset by large reductions in property crimes and somewhat by fraud and other
crimes.
The reduction in crime for middle aged men (ages 30-45) shown in Figure 3.5.1
appears to be mainly driven by the crime category others for which the crime rate is
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substantially lower than before the reform (between the ages 29-46), with a substantial
impact also from a reduction in property crimes (for ages 28-43), which is strongest
for men in their mid-thirties. Traﬃc crimes reduced between ages 30-40 (mainly for
ages 34-41) after the reform which also contributes to the overall reduction. Fraud
and tax crimes (between ages 28-42) and to a lesser degree violent crimes (between
ages 32-40) also decreased for middle aged men.
At older ages 45 through 55 traﬃc crimes increased relative to before the policy.
This pattern is also prevalent in the drugs crime category, but weaker. It seems that
traﬃc and drugs crimes increase later in life which makes up for the small increase
in overall crime for this age group, while the overall increase in crime seems to be
dampened by a reduction in other crimes for that age group.
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Figure 3.3: Average Crime Rates by Age
3.3.1: Main Crime Rates
3.3.2: Total Crime Rates
Notes: Figure 3.3.1 plots the average crime rates before (blue dots) and after (red diamonds) the
reform for the main crime rate. The main crime rate is deﬁned as the number of crimes committed
in a county-month-age per 100,000 of the male population in that cell, that subsequently led to a
conviction and are the main/most severe violations within a single conviction. Figure 3.3.2 shows
the average crime rates before (blue dots) and after (red diamonds) the reform for the total crime
rate. The total crime rate is deﬁned as the total number of crimes committed in a county-month-age
per 100,000 of the male population in that cell, that subsequently led to a conviction.
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Figure 3.4: Average Crime Rates Diﬀerences by Age
3.4.1: Main Crime Rate Diﬀerence
3.4.2: Total Crime Rate Diﬀerence
Notes: Figure 3.4.1 shows the diﬀerence in average crime rates before and after the reform for the
main crime rate. The main crime rate is deﬁned as the number of crimes committed in a county-
month-age per 100,000 of the male population in that cell, that subsequently led to a conviction and
are the main/most severe violations within a single conviction. Figure 3.4.2 shows the diﬀerence
in average crime rates before and after the reform for the total crime rate. The total crime rate
is deﬁned as the total number of crimes committed in a county-month-age per 100,000 of the male
population in that cell, that subsequently led to a conviction.
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Figure 3.5: Crime Rates Diﬀerences by Types of Crimes and Age
3.5.1: Main Crime Rate Diﬀerence 3.5.2: Violent Crime Rate Diﬀerence
3.5.3: Property Crime Rate Diﬀerence 3.5.4: Fraud Crime Rate Diﬀerence
3.5.5: Drugs Crime Rate Diﬀerence 3.5.6: Traﬃc Crime Rate Diﬀerence
3.5.7: Others Crime Rate Diﬀerence 3.5.8: Sex Crime Rate Diﬀerence
Notes: Figure 3.5.1 shows the diﬀerence in average main crime rates after and before the reform.




3.5.1 Alcohol Availability and Crime
The age-speciﬁc policy eﬀects on aggregated main crime using Equation 3.2 are pre-
sented in Figure 3.6. The x-axis represents ages a = 16, ..., 64 and the y-axis shows
the point estimate for βa including the 95 percent conﬁdence interval, represented
by the red vertical lines. I focus on the most serious crime within a conviction, the
main aggregated crime rate, for which I also have detailed information on the type of
crime.17
In line with the descriptive evidence in Figure 3.4.1 two age groups experience
a signiﬁcant reduction in total main crime following the policy: teenagers (16-17)
and middle aged men (32-42). As in the descriptive evidence the magnitude of the
eﬀects is largest for men in their mid to late thirties (35-38) and for teenage boys.
This pattern observed in the unconditional diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence approach shown in
Figure 3.6.1 remains robust towards speciﬁcations including county and month ﬁxed
eﬀects, county speciﬁc labour market and education variables, and county speciﬁc
time trends presented in Figures 3.6.2 through 3.6.4. The eﬀects on some ages become
weaker, namely for men in their thirties and early forties. The increase in crime for
men in their twenties, observed previously, remains strong and signiﬁcant for men
between the ages 22-28 and appears to be robust towards the inclusion of the full
set of controls, ﬁxed eﬀects and trends presented in Equation 3.2. The positive eﬀect
later in life through the ages 45 to 55 documented by the descriptive evidence (if only
weakly) remains a small eﬀect, signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level only for some ages
(47-51, 44-51 including county speciﬁc controls, or only for ages 50-52 when including
county speciﬁc trends) and is not robust to diﬀerent speciﬁcations. Based on pre-
reform crime rate levels, the magnitude of the results for teenagers corresponds to a
reduction in the overall main crime rate of about 15-20 percent. For the second group
that experienced a reduction in crime, men aged 32-42, the magnitude corresponds
to a 9 percent reduction in crime rate. Whereas, the increase for men aged 22-28
corresponds to an increase in crime of about 10 percent based on pre-reform levels.
My results for men in their twenties relates to ﬁndings of Carpenter and Dobkin
(2010) who used the variation in minimum legal drinking age across US states to argue
17The results on total crime rates in aggregate can be found in the Robustness section in Figure
3.10.
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Figure 3.6: Reform Eﬀects on Main Crime Rate by Age
3.6.1: Unconditional Eﬀects 3.6.2: Conditional on County and Month FE
3.6.3: Conditional on County Characteristics
3.6.4: Conditional on County Speciﬁc Time
Trends
Notes: Each Figure refers to a separate speciﬁcation, for the dependent variable main crime rate. The
main crime rate is deﬁned as the number of crimes committed in a county-month-age per 100,000 of
the male population in that cell, that subsequently led to a conviction and are the main/most severe
violations within a single conviction. Figure 3.6.1 shows the unconditional reform eﬀects on main
crime rate for each age, 3.6.2 conditions on county and month ﬁxed eﬀects, 3.6.3 in addition includes
county speciﬁc and age speciﬁc characteristics that vary over time, and 3.6.4 adds county speciﬁc
quadratic time trends to the regression. Monthly crime data by county and age from 01/1998-12/2009
are included. The plotted dots correspond to the age speciﬁc policy coeﬃcient. The red vertical
lines give the 95% conﬁndence intervals. Estimations are based on a Prais-Winsten regression, with
clustered standard errors on county level.
that alcohol consumption increases by 57 percent more days and arrest rates for just
21 year-old increased by 6 percent. The ﬁnding of Carpenter and Dobkin (2010) of
an increase in the overall arrest rate for those men that are legally allowed to drink,
combined with the eﬀects that they appear to indeed drink more, is similar to my
ﬁndings of making alcohol access easier and increasing overall crime rates for men in
their early to mid twenties by about 10 percent. However, my observed reductions
for the other two age groups is harder to relate to the existing literature.
In general, this study cannot make claims about the mechanisms behind the ob-
served facts in the data, it can merely document the facts and provide evidence for
its robustness. Importantly, the following sections will attempt to provide evidence
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on which types of crimes the observed reduction/increase in overall crimes can be at-
tributed to by age. In summary, there appears to be the three stylised facts on overall
main crime that the estimations conﬁrm from the descriptive evidence: a reduction
in crime for teenagers and men in their early thirties to early forties, and an increase
for those in their early to late twenties.
3.5.2 Age-Crime Proﬁles by Types of Crimes
To analyse in detail how the alcohol policy diﬀerentially aﬀects types of crimes for
diﬀerent ages and which crimes are driving the established facts on total main crime
I estimated Equation 3.2 for seven diﬀerent outcome variables, corresponding to the
crime rate in each county and month and age for men in each crime category j.
Figure 3.7 shows the estimated age speciﬁc coeﬃcients for each category based on the
preferred speciﬁcation (Spec 4), that includes county ﬁxed eﬀects, month ﬁxed eﬀects,
county characteristics by age and year, and county speciﬁc quadratic trends.
By far the largest eﬀect by types of crimes is a large and signiﬁcant increase in
drug related crimes for men between the ages 19-32, presented in Figure 3.7.5. The
strongest eﬀect appears to be for the younger ones in that age group and it levels
oﬀ towards the older ages substantially but remains signiﬁcant. Furthermore, this
increase in drug crimes is counterbalanced by a reduction in property crimes for men
through the ages 18 to 22 in total. While, not signiﬁcant throughout this age-group,
one can also observe positive coeﬃcients on sex crimes and violent crimes for some
ages within this age group.
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Figure 3.7: Reform Eﬀects on Types of Crimes by Age
3.7.1: Total Main Crime 3.7.2: Violent Crime
3.7.3: Property Crime 3.7.4: Fraud Crime
3.7.5: Drug Crime 3.7.6: Traﬃc Crime
3.7.7: Others Crime 3.7.8: Sex Crime
Notes: Each ﬁgure shows estimation results of the same speciﬁcation presented in Figure 3.6.4 for
diﬀerent dependent variables: crime rates of each crime type category of the main crime. Prais-
Winsten regressions, clustered standard errors on county level.
90
Among the very young ages, there is a large and signiﬁcant drop in property
crimes between the ages 16-22 conﬁrming the descriptive evidence from Figure 3.5.3.
In addition, fraud, drugs and other crimes show a signiﬁcant drop for teenagers too.
Combining this evidence the large overall reduction in total crime for 16-17 year olds
seems to stem from property, fraud, drugs and other crimes. While traﬃc and sex
crimes are moving towards the other direction with a slight increase for teenagers.
The observed pattern of a reduction in total crime for middle aged men from the
descriptives in Figure 3.4.1, that appears to be a robust and signiﬁcant reduction in
the estimations presented in Figure 3.6 is mainly driven by other crimes and traﬃc
crimes. Both those crime categories experience a large and signiﬁcant reduction for
men in their mid thirties. The results also point towards a small signiﬁcant drop in
property crimes for men around 33-38, with a signiﬁcant reduction for some ages in
violent crimes (35-38). For drugs crimes the estimates are negative throughout this
age group, though not statistically signiﬁcant. The evidence on fraud and sex crimes
for this age group is not robust enough to derive ﬁrm conclusion about the direction
and the size of the eﬀect.
The last pattern observed, though not robust to all speciﬁcation tests, was the
small increase in crime for men between 45-55. For this group the evidence in Figure
3.7.6 points towards increases in traﬃc crimes driving this earlier ﬁnding, but it seems
to be oﬀset somewhat by reductions in the other crimes category shown in Figure 3.7.7.
3.5.3 Robustness Checks
This section will further expand on robustness checks of the presented results. First,
I will present three speciﬁcations that allow for more variation across ages in the
preferred speciﬁcation (Spec 4). More speciﬁcally, I allow linear time trends to vary
by age (Speciﬁcation 5) as the concern might be that diﬀerent ages have diﬀerent time
trends in crime. Along this line, one might expect crime rates to vary across months
within a year diﬀerently for diﬀerent ages, and hence, I allow month ﬁxed eﬀects to
vary by age (Speciﬁcation 6). Finally, I let county speciﬁc ﬁxed eﬀects vary by age
too. These results are shown in Figures 3.9.1-3.9.3. It turns out that both age speciﬁc
month and age speciﬁc county ﬁxed eﬀects do not alter the results, but the inclusion
of age speciﬁc linear trends leads to a substantial decrease in precision of the policy
estimates.
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Second, Figure 3.10 presents results on the total number of crimes. The main re-
sults presented above correspond to the most severe crime listed in a single conviction,
while other crimes that are listed in the same conviction are not taken into account.
The results on total number of crimes presented in Figures 3.10.1-3.11.3 show the
same pattern as the main crime rate, just more pronounced and with a magnitude
twice as large, which is due to the larger amount of total numbers of crimes.
The dynamics of the alcohol policy on alcohol sales showed that the impact on
alcohol sales leveled oﬀ in the fourth year after the implementation of the policy
(this could be due to the temporary reduction in alcohol sales in 2004-2005 following
the abolishment of trade restrictions within the EU). I also estimated all the above
crime speciﬁcations restricting the observation period to 1998-2003. The eﬀects are
not larger for the shorter time window, indeed the results are slightly weaker. This
emphasizes that the crime rates did not only change in the short run, but pertained
at the new levels even 8-9 years after the alcohol policy was introduced.
I further expanded the robustness analysis, where I split the sample into ﬁve-year
age-groups and then estimate Equation 3.2. The results remain literally identical and
are hence not presented here.
3.6 Discussion
I evaluate the impact of a Swedish alcohol policy that liberalized opening hours in
the state monopoly on crime-age proﬁles by types of crimes. Evidence on how alcohol
policies aﬀect individuals to engage in criminal activity at diﬀerent ages and what
types of crimes are mostly aﬀected is scarce. My analysis provides evidence on this
link. It contributes towards the literature that aims to assess the impact of alcohol
policies on crime that is currently debated around the world. More recently, policies
have aimed to reduce consumption and thus crime by following more liberal alcohol
policies, such as opening hours in Brazil and Sweden, the UK Licensing Act (2003),
and hotly debated still are reductions in the minimum legal drinking age in the US
with the Amethyst Initiative. The Swedish policy that this study focuses on was not
aimed directly at reducing crime. The eﬀects of this alcohol policy using individual
crime register data on men between ages 17-23 has been studied earlier by Grönqvist
and Niknami (2011). However, my discussion of the age-speciﬁc reform eﬀects for
all ages and types of crimes is a novel contribution. I use a panel data set on crime
92
by age, and types of crimes for each county and month over the period 1998-2009 to
estimate the eﬀect of the staggered implementation of liberalized opening hours of
Sweden's alcohol stores that occurred during 2000-2001. The data was constructed
from individual register data covering all individual convictions in Sweden with details
on types of crimes. The ﬁndings of my empirical analysis show that the policy had
heterogenous eﬀects by age. Overall crime rates increased for men between the ages 20-
28, and reduced for two other age groups, the very young (16-17 year olds) and middle
aged men in their thirties. These ﬁndings are robust across various speciﬁcations.
Splitting up the analysis by types of crimes reveals, that alcohol seems to inﬂuence
diﬀerent types of crimes for diﬀerent age groups. At early ages property, drug and
fraud crimes appear to reduce signiﬁcantly which drives the overall results, while
traﬃc crimes increase for this age group and counterbalances the overall reduction
somewhat. The increase for young men in their twenties appears to be largely driven
by a strong increase in drug related oﬀences. This age group shows increases in violent
and sex crimes too, but the eﬀects are not strong throughout this age range, and not
strongly signiﬁcant. The last robust pattern found for middle aged men, a reduction
in overall crime, is driven by a reduction in other crimes and traﬃc crimes.
The ﬁndings of this study must be interpreted carefully, as they cannot contribute
towards explaining the mechanisms behind the observed pattern. The strongest eﬀect
of the alcohol policy on speciﬁc types of crimes is on drug related oﬀences. This ﬁnding
relates to the literature on the complementarity/substitutability of alcohol and drugs
(see for example, Yörük and Yörük (2011), Crost and Guerrero (2012) Anderson and
Hansen (forthcoming)). I ﬁnd a heterogenous link between alcohol and drugs by age:
evidence that could be interpreted as a complementarity between alcohol and drugs
for men in their twenties, and substitutability for teenagers and middle aged men.
However, in this study I cannot determine alcohol consumption changes of diﬀerent
age groups in response to the reform and hence the interpretation towards comple-
mentarity and substitutability of alcohol and drugs remains speculative. Though, my
ﬁnding emphasizes diﬀerences across age groups and might help explain why diﬀerent
studies ﬁnd diﬀerent results on the substitutability versus complementarity of alcohol
and drugs, as it crucially depends on the age group considered, as well as the type of
policy.
My ﬁndings point weakly towards increased traﬃc oﬀences of men between 16-
20 when alcohol is more readily available which is in line with the age-shift in DUI
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arrests found in earlier studies (see Carpenter (2005) and Carpenter (2007)). At the
same time, my ﬁnding of middle aged men being less likely to commit traﬃc violations
does not ﬁt in what other studies have found. Anecdotal evidence suggests that police
surveillance for traﬃc crimes was increased after the liberalization of opening hours.
Norström and Skog (2005) also argues that intensiﬁed screening for drunk driving
during the experimental period on Saturdays might be the possible explanation for
this observed reduction in traﬃc violations. My descriptive evidence suggests that
men in their thirties were the group most likely to be convicted for traﬃc crimes before
the reform. More police screening after the reform could have led to a deterrence eﬀect
for the group most likely to commit traﬃc crimes, which could potentially explain
the second robust ﬁnding of this study - the reduction in traﬃc crimes for middle-
aged men. However, this study cannot disentangle potential mechanisms behind the
observed pattern in the data and cannot determine whether a deterrence eﬀect was at
play. To be able to analyze a potential deterrence eﬀect through more police screening
additional data on police surveillance, for example the number of police oﬃcers on
the streets before and after the reform would be required.
Another very speculative channel, could be that increased alcohol consumption at
home reduces consumption in bars and nightclubs via a substitution eﬀect. Alcohol
bought in stores is mostly consumed at home, so increasing alcohol access in stores on
the weekends might increase alcohol consumption at home and reduce consumption
outside in bars and nightclubs. This might have led middle aged men to be less likely
to drink and drive (because they are rather staying at home when drinking). For
teenagers increasing alcohol access (of siblings and friends) might also induce more
consumption at home where vandalism, violent crimes and other public disturbances
are less likely to happen than in bars or nightclubs. These arguments could help
explain the reduction in property crimes, violent crimes and drugs crimes, but they
are mere speculation and require a more thorough analysis, based on additional data
on where people consume alcohol after the reform happened.
In conclusion, this chapter provides new facts on how liberalized opening hours
inﬂuence crime by age. It emphasises that alcohol liberalization can both increase and
reduce crime, and that the eﬀect of such policies are heterogenous across age groups
and types of crimes. Alcohol policies can have implications for various types of crimes,
in particular the link between alcohol and drugs are important. The mechanisms
behind the observed pattern remain an open question for future research.
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3.7 Appendix - Chapter 3
Figure 3.8: Yearly Number of Convictions by Type
Notes: Figure shows yearly number of convictions by types of crimes.
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Figure 3.9: Robustness Checks on Reform Eﬀects on Main Crime Rates by Age
3.9.1: Age Speciﬁc Linear Time Trends 3.9.2: Age Speciﬁc Month Fixed Eﬀects
3.9.3: Age Speciﬁc County Fixed Eﬀects
Notes: Each ﬁgure refers to a separate robustness speciﬁcation, for the dependent variable main
crime rate. The main crime rate is deﬁned as the number of crimes committed in a county-month-
age per 100,000 of the male population in that cell, that subsequently led to a conviction and are the
main/most severe violations within a single conviction. Figure 3.9.1 includes county and month ﬁxed
eﬀects, county characteristics and age speciﬁc linear time trends, Figure 3.9.2 includes county ﬁxed
eﬀects, county characteristics, county speciﬁc quadratic trends and age speciﬁc month ﬁxed eﬀects,
Figure 3.9.3 includes month ﬁxed eﬀects, county characteristics, county speciﬁc quadratic trends
and age speciﬁc county ﬁxed eﬀects. Monthly crime data by county and age from 01/1998-12/2009
are included. The plotted dots correspond to the age speciﬁc policy coeﬃcient. The red vertical
lines give the 95% conﬁdence intervals. Estimations are based on a Prais-Winsten regression, with
clustered standard errors on county level.
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Figure 3.10: Reform Eﬀects on Total Crime Rates by Age
3.10.1: Unconditional Eﬀects 3.10.2: Conditional on County and Month FE
3.10.3: Conditional on County Characteristics
3.10.4: Conditional on County Speciﬁc Time
Trends
Notes: Each ﬁgure refers to a separate speciﬁcation, for the dependent variable total crime rate.
The total crime rate is deﬁned as the total number of crimes committed in a county-month-age per
100,000 of the male population in that cell, that subsequently led to a conviction. Figure 3.6.1 shows
the unconditional reform eﬀects on total crime rate for each age, 3.6.2 conditions on county and
month ﬁxed eﬀects, 3.6.3 in addition includes county speciﬁc and age speciﬁc characteristics that
vary over time, and 3.6.4 adds county speciﬁc quadratic time trends to the regression. Monthly crime
data by county and age from 01/1998-12/2009 are included. The plotted dots correspond to the age
speciﬁc policy coeﬃcient. The red vertical lines give the 95% conﬁdence intervals. Estimations are
based on a Prais-Winsten regression, with clustered standard errors on county level.
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Figure 3.11: Robustness Checks on Reform Eﬀects on Total Crime Rates by Age
3.11.1: Age Speciﬁc Linear Time Trends 3.11.2: Age Speciﬁc Month Fixed Eﬀects
3.11.3: Age Speciﬁc County Fixed Eﬀects
Notes: Each ﬁgure refers to a separate robustness speciﬁcation, for the dependent variable total crime
rate. The total crime rate is deﬁned as the total number of crimes committed in a county-month-age
per 100,000 of the male population in that cell, that subsequently led to a conviction. Figure 3.11.1
includes county and month ﬁxed eﬀects, county characteristics and age speciﬁc linear time trends,
Figure 3.11.2 includes county ﬁxed eﬀects, county characteristics, county speciﬁc quadratic trends
and age speciﬁc month ﬁxed eﬀects, Figure 3.11.3 includes month ﬁxed eﬀects, county characteristics,
county speciﬁc quadratic trends and age speciﬁc county ﬁxed eﬀects. Monthly crime data by county
and age from 01/1998-12/2009 are included. The plotted dots correspond to the age speciﬁc policy
coeﬃcient. The red vertical lines give the 95% conﬁdence intervals. Estimations are based on a
Prais-Winsten regression, with clustered standard errors on county level.
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Concluding Remark
In conclusion, the main contributions of this thesis are threefold. The ﬁrst main
contribution of this thesis lies in conﬁrming earlier studies on education policies and
crime on the target generation. We conﬁrm that a Swedish educational reform of
the 1950s which increased compulsory schooling and abolished tracking substantially
reduced crime of men who were directly aﬀected by the reform. Our data only enables
us to start observing them from the age of 18-21 onwards, which means we are not able
to map out a complete picture from the beginning of their criminal career. Despite
this limitation, for the selected cohorts, we are able to observe them for an age with
highest criminal activity. We document a reduction of overall crime by 1.5 percentage
points, with the eﬀects of the reform being strongest for ages 20-24. The reduction in
overall crime rates are shown to be mainly driven by a reduction in property crimes
and serious traﬃc crimes that led to a guilty court verdict. Violent and drug-related
crimes remained unaﬀected. Furthermore, the reform also reduced repeated oﬀences
for men in the relevant cohorts.
The overall ﬁnding of reduced crime rates following an increase in compulsory
schooling laws is consistent with results found in earlier studies for the US in Lochner
and Moretti (2004), and for the UK in Machin, Marie, and Vuji¢ (2011). The contri-
bution to the existing literature that this thesis provides is to conﬁrm previous results
of a substantial crime reduction following the increase in compulsory schooling for
Sweden. More importantly, this study employs more detailed individual level register
data on crime allowing us to link individuals to convictions. The data also enables us
to make statements about education policy impacts on diﬀerent types of crimes and
at diﬀerent ages of the life cycle. The ﬁndings are important because they highlight
the broader impact of education policies, and a way to improve other outcomes than
education as summarized in the context of education and crime in Lochner (2011).
Overall, these ﬁndings conﬁrm the previous studies in this ﬁeld, and support the idea
that there are ways to reduce crime that go beyond deterrence and punishment, while
at the same time having other positive impacts, i.e. increasing education and labour
market opportunities.
Future research in this area is limited by the mentioned existing studies relating
to this question with the ﬁrst papers by Lochner and Moretti (2004), and Machin,
Marie, and Vuji¢ (2011)), our study, and another Swedish study by Hjalmarsson,
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Holmlund, and Lindquist (2011) that focuses on the ﬁrst generation impact on crime
only. The literature has established that there exist secondary eﬀects of education
policy on own crime. Remaining interesting directions for future research would be
an analysis of the mechanisms behind reduced crime for the target generation. It
remains an open question through which channel increased education reduces crime.
Insights into understanding whether it is improved economic opportunities or social
values and social skills that prevents individuals to engage in criminal activity would
be of high importance to the literature on the economics of crime.
The second and more important contribution of this thesis in relation to the literature
of education policy and crime is to show that the Swedish education reform had an
intergenerational eﬀect on crime. This is a novel contribution to the literature and
addresses a new question whether exposing fathers to the reform has an impact on
the crime rates of the next generation. Our results establish substantial impacts of
father's exposure to the reform on crime rates of sons in the child generation: it
resulted in an overall decline in the crime rate by about 0.8 percentage points, mostly
driven by a decline in convictions among the 15-19 year olds. The reductions are
mainly concentrated among violent crime, traﬃc crime and fraud.
This ﬁnding of decreased child crime following an education reform has a large
signiﬁcance in the literature. It highlights that education policies can help reduce
crime not only for the target generation but also across generations. It can be placed
within the literature that aims at evaluating educational reforms and their impacts
on educational attainments of the next generation, see Black, Devereux, and Salvanes
(2005), and Holmlund, Lindhal, and Plug (2011). Furthermore, previous literature
suggests that we might expect improved parental human capital to translate to bet-
ter parenting and greater availability of resources, which may thereby improve child
crime outcomes. Our data allows us to establish that home environments for chil-
dren in families where the father was exposed to the reform improved in a number
of dimensions (earnings, education etc.) through which it might lead to a reduction
in criminality of their children. These ﬁndings are consistent with both theories of
intergenerational transmission of human capital (see e.g. Becker and Tomes, 1979) as
well as sociological theories on the eﬀect of strains (see Merton (1938)) and forma-
tion of social capital (see Coleman (1988)). It also relates to direct evidence on how
improved childhood environments and early education can reduce crime as shown in
evidence on the Perry pre-school experiment by Schweinhart, Montie, Xiang, Barnett,
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Belﬁeld, and Nores (2005), and Cunha and Heckman (2007).
What we cannot learn from our research design, however, are what mechanisms
are driving these impacts intergenerationally. With the information available we are
not able to conclusively establish the mechanisms that led to such a reduction in
sons' crime. Future research could be directed towards helping understand those
links better and try to determine the mechanisms behind a reduction in child crime
following education policies that aﬀected their fathers. Another important direction
of future research could be the magnitude of the eﬀect. The size and importance of
the intergenerational eﬀect relative to improving child outcomes directly remains an
open question. Finally, the ﬁnding of mother's reform assignment having no impact
on son's crime could be examined in more detail as well, since previous literature
has highlighted the importance of mother's education on child outcomes, for example
Carneiro, Meghir, and Parey (2013).
The third main contribution of this thesis is to show evidence of how a Swedish
alcohol policy aﬀects individuals to engage in criminal activity at diﬀerent ages and
what types of crimes are mostly aﬀected. The focus of the third chapter shifts towards
the link between alcohol and crime and thereby focuses on the situational context in
criminal activity. General statistics from the US and UK highlight the correlation
between alcohol and crime: 33 percent of state prisoners in the US reported to have
been under the inﬂuence of alcohol at the time of the oﬀence in 2004 (Bureau of Justice
Statistics (2004)); in the UK 47 percent of victims of violent incidents perceived their
oﬀender(s) to be under the inﬂuence of alcohol (Crime Survey for England and Wales
(2013)). As highlighted in detail in chapter three there exists a large literature aiming
to determine the link between alcohol and crime and diﬀerent types of alcohol policies
and their impacts on crime, for example related literature on opening hours of bars and
alcohol stores in Brazil and Sweden (see Biderman, De Mello, and Schneider (2010),
Grönqvist and Niknami (2011), Norström and Skog (2005)) and various studies using
laws on the minimum legal drinking age in the US (see Carpenter and Dobkin (2011),
Carpenter (2007)).
The speciﬁc alcohol policy evaluated here is the Swedish alcohol policy that liber-
alized opening hours in the state monopoly during the years 2000-2001. The staggered
implementation of liberalized opening hours of Sweden's alcohol stores is used to anal-
yse this link using a panel data set on crime by age, and types of crimes for each county
and month over the period 1998-2009. The main ﬁndings of the empirical analysis
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emphasize that the policy had heterogenous eﬀects by age. In contrast, the earlier
study by Grönqvist and Niknami (2011) that uses the same alcohol policy and the
same individual crime register data has only focused on men between ages 17-23. This
thesis shows that overall crime rates for men aged 20-28 increased, while crime rates
for very young men aged 16-17, and middle-aged men in their thirties reduced. Split-
ting up the analysis by types of crimes reveals that drug and fraud crimes appear to
reduce signiﬁcantly during early ages, which drives the overall results and at the same
time traﬃc crimes increase and counterbalances the overall reduction. For men in
their early twenties the majority of the increase in overall crimes can be attributed to
a strong increase in drug related oﬀences. Other crimes and especially traﬃc crimes,
appear to be driving the reduction in overall crime rates for middle aged men. Per-
haps surprisingly, violent and sex crimes cannot be shown to be inﬂuenced by this
alcohol policy.
The type of crime most aﬀected by the change in the alcohol policy are drug related
oﬀences, for which the third chapter documents a heterogenous link between alcohol
and drugs by age. Increased drug oﬀences for men in their twenties, and decreased
drug oﬀences for teenagers emphasizes diﬀerences across age groups. Diﬀerent studies
ﬁnd diﬀerent results on the substitutability versus complementarity of alcohol and
drugs (see Yörük and Yörük (2011), Crost and Guerrero (2012), and Anderson and
Hansen (forthcoming)) which appears to depend on the type of policy, type of crime
and age group considered. The attempt to relate the ﬁndings of chapter three to the
literature on the complementarity/substitutability of alcohol and drugs is limited by
the fact that I cannot determine changes in alcohol consumption of diﬀerent age groups
in response to the reform. This means the interpretation towards complementarity
and substitutability of alcohol and drugs remains speculative. Future research in this
area should aim to establish exactly which ages will see a change to their alcohol
consumption following alcohol policies. Based on this one could then map towards
alcohol related crime engagement.
By the nature of the oﬀence, driving under the inﬂuence of alcohol is often consid-
ered when alcohol policies are evaluated towards their impact on crime. The ﬁndings
in the third chapter point weakly towards increased traﬃc oﬀences for men aged 16-
20 when alcohol is more readily available which is in line with the age-shift in DUI
arrests found in earlier studies (see Carpenter (2005) and Carpenter (2007)). At the
same time, the ﬁnding of middle aged men appearing to be less likely to commit
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traﬃc violations contrasts the ﬁndings of other studies. Anecdotal evidence for the
Swedish alcohol reform exploited in this study, suggests that police surveillance for
traﬃc crimes was increased after the liberalization of opening hours. Norström and
Skog (2005) also argues that intensiﬁed screening for drunk driving during the ex-
perimental period on Saturdays might be the possible explanation for this observed
reduction in traﬃc violations. More police screening after the reform could have led
to a deterrence eﬀect for the group most likely to commit traﬃc crimes (men in their
thirties), which could potentially explain the second robust ﬁnding of this study - the
reduction in traﬃc crimes for middle-aged men. Regarding those traﬃc oﬀences, how-
ever, this study is limited by not being able to determine whether a deterrence eﬀect
was at play. To determine whether a deterrence eﬀect was at play one would require
additional data on police surveillance, for example the number of police oﬃcers on
the streets before and after the reform.
Finally, when considering the link between crime and alcohol consumption it is
important to what degree there exist social multiplier eﬀects. Alcohol consumption
in bars and nightclubs could potentially increase the risk of vandalism, violent crimes
and other public disturbances behaviour relative to alcohol consumption at home.
We might expect that alcohol consumption in bars and nightclubs is reduced via
a substitution eﬀect due to increased alcohol consumption at home (triggered by
increased access to alcohol in stores). Importantly, we might expect that to have
interaction eﬀects witch crime. While these arguments could help explain the observed
crime patterns, they remain mere speculation and require a more thorough analysis.
Future research should be concerned with additional data on where people consume
alcohol after the reform happened. This puts high demands on the data, which was
not available in this study. Overall, the major limitation of the third chapter that
one cannot disentangle potential mechanisms behind the observed pattern with the
existing data points towards remaining open questions for future research in this area.
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